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Abstract 
 
The future development of regional policy in an enlarged EU cannot be viewed simply 
from a national perspective but needs to consider the inter-relationships between 
national regional policies, EU regional policy and EU competition policy. Recent policy 
developments have been characterised by tensions between these areas of policy, 
associated with differing policy objectives and a contested division of responsibilities. 
This paper has four main objectives: to examine the evolution of national regional 
policies in the Member States; to consider the future challenges for the Structural Funds; 
to assess possible future directions for EU competition policy; and to pose questions as 
to whether and how these different components of regional policy might best be 
reconciled post 2006. The paper concludes by arguing that greater conflict is by no 
means inevitable and that a fundamental review of policy objectives, policy focus, policy 
responsibilities and the relationship between policy instruments and regulatory 
frameworks could, in fact, improve the complementarity of the policy areas rather than 
heighten tensions. 
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This paper is based on the Plenary Paper prepared  for the Sub Rosa Strategic 
Discussion on 13-14 June 2003 in Brussels. The paper was commissioned by the Sub 
Rosa Steering Group from the European Policies Research Centre, University of 
Strathclyde, and funded by Highlands and Islands Enterprise, the Scottish Executive and 
Scottish Enterprise, in order to provide a common context for the discussions.  
The paper was originally drafted as a starting point for discussion, in particular to 
promote frank, informal but confidential debate among participants at the meeting. 
Following the meeting, the paper was revised to take account of the conclusions of the 
meeting reported by the Rapporteurs and Chair of the meeting.  
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Complementarity or Conflict? 
 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, regional policy in many Member States has undergone extensive 
reassessment. In virtually every country, there has been a debate about future 
policy directions, in several cases associated with major policy reviews and new 
legislation. The changes often represent a significant break with past practice; 
this has been characterised as a shift in the ‘paradigm’ of regional policy. 
These policy developments have occurred against a background of major 
economic upheaval in the face of structural difficulties, rapid technological 
change, enhanced international competition and globalisation. At the same time, 
important new social and ecological dimensions have been introduced into 
economic development, as well as a very different institutional context for 
regional policy – involving, on the one hand, increased regionalisation of policy 
development and delivery and, on the other, more Europeanisation of 
policymaking. This has seen growing EU competition policy control of regional 
aid over the past thirty years (impacting on aid types, coverage and maxima), 
combined with the development of a distinct EU regional policy that has 
significantly influenced the implementation, focus and spatial targeting of national 
regional policy. 
The new policy environment created by these developments provides the starting 
point for this paper. The future development of regional policy in an enlarged EU 
cannot be viewed simply from a national perspective but needs to consider the 
inter-relationships between national regional policies, EU regional policy and EU 
competition policy. This is an important issue, since recent policy developments 
have been characterised by tensions between these areas of policy, associated 
with differing policy objectives and a contested division of responsibilities.  
In the light of these tensions, this paper looks beyond the current reform debates 
to consider whether friction and conflict between national regional policy, EU 
competition policy and EU regional policy is inevitable. The paper has four main 
objectives (and sections): 
• to examine the evolution of national regional policies in the Member States; 
• to consider the future challenges for the Structural Funds;  
• to assess possible future directions for EU competition policy; and 
• to pose questions as to whether and how these different components of 
regional policy might best be reconciled post 2006.  
Regional Policies After 2006: Complementarity or Conflict? 
 
European Policy Research Paper, No. 51    European Policies Research Centre 2
NATIONAL REGIONAL POLICIES 
The most significant longer-term developments in Member State regional policies 
are: a shift in policy objectives towards the promotion of regional 
competitiveness; a decline of traditional demand-side policy instruments in favour 
of softer, supply-side measures; a contraction of regional aid areas; a growth of 
bottom-up, local economic development initiatives; more policy targeting; 
changes in policy governance (towards decentralisation, partnership and policy 
coordination); and a growing interest in sustainability and social inclusion. It is 
possible to characterise these policy trends in terms of movements towards a 
new regional policy paradigm. However, the usefulness of this conceptualisation 
depends on the extent to which such policy developments are continuing to take 
place. While trends are not universal, a review of recent policy change confirms 
many of the above generalisations. 
The past two or three years has been a period of continuing high levels of policy 
change, stimulated on the one hand by the beginning of a new Structural Funds 
programming period and, on the other, by the entry into force of new Regional 
Aid Guidelines from the start of 2000. White papers, policy frameworks, strategy 
documents and policy memoranda have been published in Denmark, Finland, 
France, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom, while the joint 
Federal-Land approach to regional policy delivery has been the subject of review 
in Germany. Added to this are important revisions of policy in those countries 
where the Structural Funds play a major role – Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain – and it is clear that the scale of recent policy review and change has 
been significant.  
Recent policy developments have seen: more stress on the efficiency goals of 
regional policy, reflecting a growing emphasis on international competitiveness 
and productivity and on the role of regional competitiveness in contributing to 
national growth and development; a continuation of the shift in policy focus to the 
regional level in the context of broader devolutionary and regionalisation trends; 
increased interest in policy coordination – at the national level, in the regions and 
between the centre and the regions; more pressure on regional policy budgets; 
related, a tendency to move away from business aid and towards non-aid-based 
instruments involving more integrated approaches and incorporating a wider 
range of policy instruments; and increased targeting of regional aid. Many of 
these developments reflect the significant impact which the Regional Aid 
Guidelines and Structural Fund Regulations have had on Member State regional 
policies. They have also had a marked influence on developments in the new 
Member States in the context of the accession negotiations. 
EU REGIONAL POLICY 
EU regional policy is in a challenging and dynamic period of change. Not only are 
there significant administrative challenges to overcome in both the current and 
the new Member States but, of longer term significance, there is a major ongoing 
debate about the reform of EU regional policy after 2006.  
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Post 2006, the principal policy challenge concerns economic and social cohesion 
in an enlarged Union. Enlargement will lead to a severely imbalanced EU territory 
in terms of the widening disparities between Member States and especially 
between regions and in the capacity of Member States to address regional 
problems. The challenge of economic and social cohesion has to be set within 
the overarching EU policy priority of improving competitiveness, as agreed at the 
Lisbon Council. So far, progress has been slow in EU-15 and will be even more 
difficult to achieve in the new Member States. Moreover, there is currently no 
mechanism for linking the Lisbon agenda with EU regional policy.  
Integral to the EU’s competitiveness objective is the question of the sustainability 
of development (as agreed at the Gothenburg Council). Current programmes are 
subject to extensive sustainability requirements, but research suggests that 
progress is uneven. A ‘step change’ will be needed in learning, commitment and 
practice if the ambitious and integrated response required by the Gothenburg 
objectives is to be achieved. 
The degree to which EU regional policy can meet these various challenges will 
be determined by budgetary constraints. The period of successive increases in 
EU regional policy ended at the Berlin Council in March 1999. This underlined 
the importance of base year figures for the subsequent flow of funds. A range of 
parameters seem likely to influence the financial envelope for the 2007-2013 
period:  
• the commitment allocation for 2006; 
• the current ceiling on structural operations spending (0.45 percent of EU 
GDP); 
• the absorption cap for structural spending in the new Member States (4 
percent of GDP for the 2004-2006 period);  
• levels of aid per head for different categories of area; 
• the split between the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund. 
There is an ongoing debate as to whether funding should be set below, at or 
above the current ceiling of 0.45 percent of EU GDP. As an indication of the 
range of possible expenditure, the EU regional policy budget for 2007-2013 could 
vary between €270 billion (if spending in 2006 is used as the reference point) and 
€350 billion (if related to the 0.45 percent ceiling). 
A further aspect of the debate concerns possible allocations of the budget. The 
complexity of the issue can be illustrated by the different types of eligible 
Structural Fund area being considered post 2006: Objective 1 areas; statistical 
effect regions (Objective 1A); special provision regions (low population density, 
outermost regions); Objective 1 phase-out regions; and regions outside Objective 
1. There are diverse views on a future ‘Objective 2’. These concern: the 
proportion of funding that should be allocated to non-Objective 1 areas; the 
priorities for the assistance (possibly menu-based); and the process of area 
designation. In addition, the allocation of the Cohesion Fund must also be 
considered 
The reform of the Funds must also be seen in the context of the current debate of 
the future governance of the EU. The EC, other European institutions and many 
Member States and subnational interests support the current model whereby the 
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task of addressing economic and social cohesion is shared among European, 
national and subnational levels. A fundamentally different approach has been 
advocated by countries such as the Netherlands, Sweden and United Kingdom, 
which consider that the current approach is no longer sustainable. A further 
aspect of the implementation debate concerns the simplification of systems and 
procedures for administering structural actions. 
Finally, the future course of EU regional policy is being influenced by perceptions 
of effectiveness and, in particular, ‘Community added value’. Structural Fund 
programmes have had tangible net economic impacts in the Cohesion countries 
and other large Objective 1 regions. Outside these areas, economic impacts are 
difficult to quantify. However, the Funds have enabled additional economic 
activity to take place and the quality of economic development to be improved as 
well as acting as a catalyst for regeneration. More broadly, important qualitative 
effects have been identified relating to the deployment of economic development 
resources; the promotion of a strategic dimension in policymaking; the 
introduction of new types of intervention; enhanced partnership; and the 
promotion of a learning and innovation dynamic. On the other hand, added value 
is currently undermined by administrative complexities, fragmented maps, the 
n+2 rule and risk-averse funding mechanisms. 
EU COMPETITION POLICY 
EU competition policy control of State aid is entering a new phase. Although the 
extent of material change to date is modest, it is clear that the Commission 
recognises the need to modernise its handling of State aid discipline to reflect 
new realities. Chief amongst these is the impact of enlargement. In addition, the 
liberalisation agenda has exposed new activities to international competition, 
highlighting the potential conflict between the universal provision of key services 
and the State aid rules. Further, the increasingly sophisticated range of policy 
instruments designed by national policymakers keen to operate ‘close’ to the 
market poses new challenges to existing approaches to State aid control.  
Several important themes have emerged from recent Council conclusions and 
Commission reports and statements. First, recent developments in State aid 
control have given greater prominence to market failure arguments in the 
justification for State aid (though the Commission has emphasised the need to 
question whether State aid is always the most appropriate response to market 
failures). Second, there has been more emphasis on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of State aid and, related, a growing interest in evaluation and 
exchange of experience. Third, there has been a Commission commitment to 
consider the feasibility of developing economic criteria for assessing State aid 
impacts. And finally, efforts have been made to simplify, modernise and clarify 
the State aid rules.  
With respect to the control of regional aid, the Commission has confirmed that 
the Regional Aid Guidelines introduced in 1998 are set to apply unchanged until 
2006. It has also indicated that a review of the rules will be carried out “in due 
course” in order to enable the notification and approval of new assisted area 
maps for the period after 1 January 2007. DG Competition is conducting a 
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‘sounding out’ exercise involving externally-commissioned studies, bilateral 
discussions with the Member States and internal policy review; Commissioner 
Monti also asked Member States to provide any comments, observations or 
information relevant to a review of the Guidelines by 30 May 2003. In short, 
although the current guidelines will apply unchanged until 2006, regional aid 
control policy is about to enter a period of intense scrutiny. 
No decision has apparently yet been taken on whether a radically new approach 
might be adopted post 2006 or whether small adjustments to the existing 
approach might suffice. What seems clear, however, is that maintaining the 
status quo is not a realistic long-term option. Reasons for this include: the impact 
of enlargement; the outcome of the German legal challenge to the Commission 
Decision based on the guidelines; and the attitudes of national regional 
policymakers. Each of these factors has important implications for the future 
design of regional aid controls. 
COMPLEMENTARITY OR CONFLICT? 
A common theme of the above trends is that of change. National regional policies 
in many countries have been characterized as increasingly based on new policy 
paradigms. EU regional policy faces not only the challenge of enlargement but 
also the need to address some major governance issues. EU competition policy 
is confronting an ambitious reform agenda. In entering a period of reappraisal, a 
key question is how future policy interrelationships might evolve.  
The final section first reviews current policy relationships and tensions between 
the three areas of policy. It then considers whether future linkages are set to be 
more complementary or more conflictual. Four main aspects of policy are 
addressed: policy objectives; policy focus; policy governance; and policy 
instruments. Key questions are: 
• Policy objectives: what does cohesion mean? 
• Policy governance: who should do what and why? 
• Policy focus: is spatial targeting really the way forward? 
• Policy instruments: how to facilitate innovation? 
The section concludes by arguing that greater conflict is by no means inevitable 
and that a fundamental review of policy objectives, policy focus, policy 
responsibilities and the relationship between policy instruments and regulatory 
frameworks could, in fact, improve the complementarity of the policy areas rather 
than heighten tensions. 
It is perhaps unrealistic to imagine that such potentially radical considerations are 
really on the agenda. Precedent is a powerful driving force in EU policy evolution 
and many Member States are likely to prefer the comfort of minor and relatively 
predictable adjustments to an existing approach (however unsatisfactory) rather 
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than a radical overhaul that seeks to address the underlying objectives of policy. 
This may indeed mean that policy change is incremental, but it is important that it 
also be effective and coherent. 
                                                
1  
2  
3  
4. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The changing context for national regional policies 
Over the past decade, regional policy in most EU Member States has undergone 
extensive reassessment. In virtually every country there has been a debate about 
future policy directions, in several cases associated with policy reviews and new 
legislation. The changes often represent a significant break with past practice; 
this has been characterised as a shift in the ‘paradigm’ of regional policy.5 
These policy developments have occurred against a background of major 
upheaval in the ‘global socio-economic order’ over the past 25 years and lively 
theoretical debates about patterns and processes of regional development. For 
many Member States, the last few decades have been a period of difficult 
adjustment. With some exceptions, sustainable high rates of economic growth 
have proven difficult to achieve, and unemployment rates have often been high, 
not just in designated regional policy areas but nationwide, with youth and long-
term unemployment being particular concerns. In addition, governments have 
had to deal with regionally-concentrated economic development problems, 
notably in old-industrialised areas, whilst also facing threats to competitive 
advantage across the economy in agriculture, traditional and modern industrial 
sectors and in producer services, affecting many parts of the country. 
During this period, the rapidity of technological change, combined with market 
liberalisation and deregulation, has greatly increased the exposure of regions 
and countries to international competition. Enterprises have greater flexibility in 
the production and delivery of goods and services, and investment is more 
mobile. Especially within Europe, barriers to trade, investment and factor mobility 
have been reduced, and governments are less able and willing to provide 
protection to sectors or firms. 
In this more globalised production environment, competition is increasingly 
viewed as being between regions and cities, rather than countries. Successful 
regions are those that can develop and maintain agglomeration economies in 
competitive sectors. Competitive success is based on the ability to adapt and 
innovate, produce new ideas, products and services. Effective systems of 
adaptation and innovation depend not only on factors such as the quality of 
infrastructure, SMEs, the skills base and sources of RTD but also the types of 
relations, inter-relationships and networks between institutions (public, private, 
quasi-private) that facilitate the flow of ideas, knowledge, finance and technology. 
                                                
5 Bachtler J and Raines P (2002) A New Paradigm of Regional Policy? Reviewing Recent Trends in Europe, 
Report to the EoRPA Regional Policy Research Consortium, European Policies Research Centre, University 
of Strathclyde. 
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There are also important new social and ecological dimensions of economic 
development. Public policy has increasingly recognised the social factors that 
underly the exclusion of certain groups from the labour market and economy, 
especially women, the disabled and ethnic minorities. There has also been a 
growth in concern about the environmental implications of economic and social 
activity, from global issues such as climate change and species diversity to more 
local matters such as waste management, water quality and ground pollution. 
Reflecting this, sustainable development has become a common policy theme, 
based on an increasing recognition of the need to take account of the inter-
relationships between the economic, social and environmental aspects of 
development.  
Finally, the institutional context for regional policy has changed. At one level, 
there is increased involvement in economic development on the part of regional 
and local institutions and groups, as a substitute for, or complement to, central 
government action. Issues of regional identity, local democracy and 
accountability also underlie a general trend for the devolution and 
decentralisation (to differing degrees) of central government responsibilities. At 
another level, there has been a clear trend towards the Europeanisation of 
policymaking through the influence of EU structural and cohesion funds and EU 
competition policy on the regional policies of Member States. 
1.2 Changing EU policy frameworks 
Provisions for the competition policy control of State aid within the Member 
States are in the original Treaty articles and, as early as the 1960s and 1970s, 
the Commission began to have an impact on the use of State aids as instruments 
of regional policy.6 Over the years, Commission interventions became both more 
extensive and more systematic, increasingly constraining the types of aid on 
offer, the coverage of the designated aid areas and the maximum rates of award 
available in those areas. The growing influence of DG Competition on Member 
State’s regional policy culminated in the publication of the Regional Aid 
Guidelines in March 1998;7 these equated regional aid discipline with control of 
the coverage of the regional aid areas (both globally and within the individual 
Member States) and required the Commission to approve both the methodology 
adopted for area designation and the geographical units used as designation 
building blocks. Taken together with the need for Commission approval of award 
maxima and Commission determination of acceptable forms of aid, this left only 
regional aid expenditure outside the direct control of the competition policy 
authorities. 
Compared to the control of State aid, economic and social cohesion has been a 
relatively recent Treaty preoccupation. Although the Community operated a 
nascent regional policy from the 1970s, this was initially an adjunct to (and 
subsidy for) national regional policies. The status of Community economic and 
social cohesion policy changed radically in the mid 1980s, its upgrading largely a 
                                                
6 For an overview of the development of regional State aid policy, see Wishlade, F G (2003) Regional State 
Aid and Competition Policy in the European Union, Kluwer European Monographs 43, Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague. 
7 EC (1998) Guidelines on national regional aid, Official Journal of the European Communities C74; 
10.3.1998, pp 9-31. 
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consequence of negotiations over the Single European Act and the associated 
completion of the Single Market. Subsequently, the reform of the Structural 
Funds in 1988 created a distinct EU regional policy, with important implications 
for national approaches to regional development. In particular, EU policy 
principles (eg. programming, partnership, evaluation) increasingly permeated 
national regional policy, while the need for co-finance directly influenced national 
policy priorities. In addition, the creation of an EU-wide typology of regions 
impacted on the designation of national regional policy areas, the more so since 
DG Regio was keen to achieve coherence between national and EU designated 
areas. 
1.3 Changing policy interrelationships 
The new policy environment created by these developments provides the starting 
point for this paper. The future development of regional policy in an enlarged EU 
cannot be viewed simply from a national perspective but needs to consider the 
inter-relationships between national regional policies, EU regional policy and EU 
competition policy. This is an important issue since recent policy developments 
have been characterised by significant tensions between these areas of policy, 
associated with differing policy objectives and a contested division of 
responsibilities. 
Each of the three policy areas – national regional policy, EU regional policy and 
EU competition policy – was established to meet specific policy needs. Each has 
evolved along trajectories over the past 30 years such that they now increasingly 
impinge on each other. Indeed, it can be argued that it is now almost impossible 
to consider one area of policy without taking account of the other two. It is 
evident that while each policy area has an internal logic in terms of political 
objectives and policy priorities, the inter-relationships between them are, in some 
respects, becoming a source of tension and conflict. In reviewing future policy 
options, it is therefore essential to take a more holistic view and consider how 
these three policy areas are likely to interact post 2006. 
1.4 Objectives of the paper 
The aim of this paper is to look beyond the detail of the current reform debate to 
consider broader policy influences and trends with respect to national regional 
policies, EU regional policy and EU competition policy. In particular, the paper 
discusses whether further friction between these three areas of policy is 
inevitable. This might be considered to be likely in a post enlargement situation 
which seems bound to be characterised by enhanced policy concentration and 
selectivity, certainly within EU-15. 
This paper has four main objectives: 
• to examine the evolution of national regional policies in the Member 
States, notably the growing concern with regional growth and 
competitiveness, but also associated trends towards the regionalisation, 
coordination and consolidation of policy; 
• to consider the future challenges for the Structural Funds; while the main 
policy goal must relate to the achievement of economic and social cohesion 
in an enlarged Union, other concerns include the overarching EU policy 
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priority of improving competitiveness, the question of how to achieve 
sustainable development over time, the difficulty of responding to growing 
budgetary constraints, the need to take account of changing views about the 
future governance of the EU and the importance of demonstrating policy 
effectiveness; 
• to assess possible future directions for EU competition policy; in 
particular, how it might reconcile the need to be more sensitive to the wishes 
of countries and regions to operate a viable regional policy with the desire to 
maintain competition policy ambitions of concentrating regional support and 
avoiding competition distortions; and 
• to pose questions as to whether and how these different components of 
regional policy might best be reconciled post 2006.  
The paper is in four further sections. The first three deal in turn with key policy 
developments and future policy challenges for national regional policies, EU 
regional policy and EU competition policy respectively. The final section then 
reviews the main tensions that exist between and among these three areas of 
policy, before discussing questions about the future operation of regional policy 
in the EU. 
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2. NATIONAL REGIONAL POLICY – A NEW PARADIGM 
2.1 Longer-term trends 
As a starting point it is useful to consider the most significant longer-term 
developments in Member State regional policies. As highlighted in the first Sub 
Rosa paper (in 2000),8 the key drivers of national regional policy are: 
• enhanced international competitive pressures; 
• a recognition of the importance of more localised policy responses to 
increasingly complex spatial problems; 
• a growing interest in the decentralisation of government associated with 
changing attitudes to regional problems and disparities; and 
• increasingly influential EU policy frameworks. 
These developments are influencing a number of important longer-term policy 
trends:  
• a shift in policy objectives towards the promotion of regional competitiveness; 
• a decline of traditional demand-side policy instruments (particularly business 
aid schemes) in favour of softer, supply-side measures; 
• a contraction of regional aid areas; 
• a growth of bottom-up local economic development initiatives; 
• more policy targeting both spatially (in particular, towards urban areas) and 
sectorally (clusters); 
• changes in policy governance (towards decentralisation, partnership and 
policy co-ordination); and 
• a growing interest in sustainability and social inclusion. 
It is possible to characterise these various policy trends in terms of movements 
towards a new regional policy paradigm.9 This identifies a new type of regional 
policy, termed ‘modern regional policy’ in Table 1. Such policy appears to want to 
achieve both equity and efficiency, in contrast to the focus on equity or efficiency 
under traditional (classical) regional policy. The sphere of policy action is broad, 
operating over numerous sectors, with a planned, pro-active and strategic 
approach, rather than the essentially reactive, project-based focus of traditional  
policies. Policy encompasses all regions rather than just the designated aid 
areas of classical regional policy. Further, support aims to develop the business 
environment, with multiple policy targets and types of instruments; this contrasts 
                                                
8 Bachtler J, Wishlade F and Yuill D (2000) Regional Policy in Europe after Enlargement, Paper prepared for 
the first Sub Rosa meeting on 29-30 September 2000, final version – 12 December 2000. 
9 Bachtler J (2000) Where is Regional Policy Going? Changing Concepts of Regional Policy, Report to the 
EoRPA Regional Policy Research Consortium, European Policies Research Centre, University of 
Strathclyde. 
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with traditional policy which tends to operate via demand-side measures, 
particularly business aid schemes. Another feature of modern regional policy is 
that it is based on region-level analysis to create regional solutions, involving 
negotiation if not consensus between partners – bargaining is both horizontal 
(within the region) and vertical (between levels of government). Classical regional 
policy operates instead through top-down centralised mechanisms. Lastly, 
modern policy implementation operates over multi-annual planning and is subject 
to ongoing monitoring and evaluation. In contrast, traditional regional policy is 
built around annual budgets and tends to be evaluated ex post. 
Source: Bachtler J (2000) op. cit. 
Table 1: The Changing Paradigm of Regional Policy 
 
Criteria Classical Modern 
 
CONCEPTUAL BASIS 
 
 
 
Industrial location theories 
Key factors are regional 
attributes eg. production 
costs, availability of 
workers 
 
 
Learning region theories 
Key factors are regional capabilities 
eg. innovative milieux, clusters, 
networks 
 
POLICY CHARACTERISTICS 
Aim(s) Equity or efficiency Equity and efficiency 
Objectives Employment creation 
Increased investment 
Increased competitiveness (eg. 
entrepreneurship, innovation, skills) 
Sphere of action Narrow 
(economic/industrial) 
Broad (multi-sectoral) 
Mode of operation Reactive, project based Pro-active, planned, strategic 
 
POLICY STRUCTURE 
  
Spatial focus Problem areas All regions 
Analytical base Designation indicators 
Regional exporting 
Regional SWOT analysis 
Key instrument Incentive scheme Development programme 
Assistance Business aid 
Hard infrastructure 
Business environment 
Soft infrastructure 
 
ORGANISATION 
  
Policy development Top down/centralised Collective/negotiated 
Lead organisation Central government Regional authorities 
Partners None Local government 
Voluntary sector, Social partners 
Administration Simple/rational Complex/bureaucratic 
Project selection Internalised Participative 
Timescale Annual budgets Multi-annual planning periods 
 
EVALUATION 
  
Stage(s) Ex post Ex ante, interim, ex post 
Outcomes Measurable Difficult to measure 
Regional Policies After 2006: Complementarity or Conflict? 
 
European Policy Research Paper, No. 51    European Policies Research Centre 13
The usefulness of this conceptualisation depends, of course, on the extent to 
which it fits with reality. While trends are not universal, a review of recent policy 
change confirms many of the above generalisations.10 
2.2 Recent policy developments 
The past 2-3 years has been a period of continuing high levels of policy change, 
stimulated on the one hand by the beginning of a new Structural Funds 
programming period and, on the other, by the entry into force of new Regional 
Aid Guidelines from the start of 2000. Among the EU-15 countries, white papers, 
policy frameworks, strategy documents and policy memoranda have been 
published in Denmark11, Finland12, France13, the Netherlands14, Sweden15 and 
the United Kingdom16, while the joint Federal-Land approach to regional policy 
delivery has been the subject of review in Germany. Add to this, important 
revisions of policy in those countries where the Structural Funds play a major role 
– Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain – and it is clear that the scale of 
recent policy review and change has been significant. In the new Member States, 
regional policies have also been overhauled, or, in many cases established for 
the first time on market economic lines, as part of the preparations for EU 
accession. 
2.2.1 More stress on the efficiency goals of policy 
Reviewing policy developments in the EU-15 in more detail, within regional policy 
(and economic development policy more generally), there has been a growing 
emphasis on international competitiveness and productivity and on the role of 
regional competitiveness in contributing to national growth and development. 
Most countries now stress the efficiency goals of regional policy rather than, or 
as well as, equality objectives. In many cases, productivity improvements have 
become a central policy goal. Related, in a number of countries there has been a 
move away from spatially-targeted intervention in favour of broader support for 
economic development in all regions. 
In Finland, for instance, the main policy goal has become the promotion of 
regional competitiveness (rather than territorial balance) and the range of policy 
instruments has widened with a view to developing a competitive regional 
structure across the country as a whole. In the Netherlands, the appropriateness 
of the last remaining element of classical regional policy, targeted at the north of 
                                                
10 Yuill D (2002) A Comparative Overview of Recent Regional Policy Developments in the Member States 
and Norway, Report to the EoRPA Regional Policy Research Consortium, European Policies Research 
Centre, University of Strathclyde.  
11 Regeringen (2001) Regional erhvervspolitisk redegørelse, .reg21, København, Erhvervsministeriet. 
12 Regional Development Act 602/2002 (www.finlex.fi/pdf/saadkaan/E0020602.PDF). 
13 Loi d’orientation pour l’aménagement et le développement durable du territoire (LOADDT), also known as 
the loi Voynet 1999. 
14 Ministerie van Economische Zaken (2000) Nota Ruimtelijk Economische Beleid: Dynamiek in netwerken 
The Hague. 
15 Government Bill 2001/02:4, A Policy for Growth and Viability throughout Sweden (En politik för tillväxt och 
livskraft i hela landet). 
16 DTI/DoEE (2001) Opportunity for All in a World of Change, A White Paper on Enterprise, Skills and 
Innovation, (Cm5052) The Stationery Office, London. HM Treasury, the DTI and the ODPM (2003) A 
Modern Regional Policy for the United Kingdom, (DTI URN 03/649) available at 
www.dti.gov.uk/europe/consultation.pdf. 
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the country, has been questioned in light of the need to focus policy on areas of 
productivity growth. In Sweden, though traditional regional policy is largely 
unchanged, recent legislation has seen a shift in emphasis towards broader, 
programme-based measures with a view to stimulating regional competitiveness, 
growth and employment in all regions. In Austria, both the Regional Innovation 
Premium and Regional Infrastructure Support have been withdrawn as the focus 
has shifted towards non-spatially-targeted innovation policies. And in the United 
Kingdom, recent White Papers have stressed regional rather than national 
solutions to regional development problems: “The new approach [to regional 
policy in England] will be based on putting greater emphasis on growth within all 
regions and strengthening the building blocks of economic success by boosting 
regional capacity for innovation, enterprise and skills development”.17 
2.2.2 Shift in policy focus to the regional level 
At the same time, there has been a continuation of the shift in policy focus to the 
regional level in the context of broader devolutionary and regionalisation trends. 
Many factors have contributed to these developments, including in particular the 
increasing weight attached to regional competitiveness. There is now much more 
stress on regional actors in economic development, strengthening regional 
capabilities and enhancing the role of the region in the policy process; more 
emphasis on tailoring policy to the needs of individual regions; more weight on 
regional-level programming and on policy coordination at the regional level; more 
effort to regionalise national priorities (for instance, by feeding regional 
information into national expenditure decisions); and more recognition of the role 
of regional urban centres in economic development. 
Set in the context of longer-term trends in the decentralisation of regional policy 
administration, such changes represent a significant shift towards the regional 
level across a wide range of countries. This is especially obvious in countries like 
Italy and the United Kingdom, where broader constitutional reforms have been 
undertaken, but it is also clear for instance throughout the Nordic Member States. 
In addition, countries like Ireland and Portugal, which previously operated highly 
centralised systems, have begun to introduce elements of regionalisation into the 
delivery of policy. At the other end of the spectrum, pressures have arisen in 
federal Germany (albeit for non-regional-policy reasons) to abolish the 
coordination and regulatory framework provided by the joint Federal-Land 
regional policy Gemeinschaftsaufgabe (GA) and return instead to the position of 
more than 30 years ago where regional policy was Land-determined. There are 
many factors which have contributed to the growing emphasis placed on the 
regional level. At their core, however, is the increasing stress on the importance 
of regional competitiveness for economic development and the belief that this is 
likely to be strengthened by facilitating regional solutions to regional problems. 
                                                
17 Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and Department for Education and Employment (DfEE) (2001) 
Opportunity for All in a World of Change. 
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2.2.3 Increased interest in policy coordination 
Related to these regionalisation trends, many countries have become 
increasingly interested in how regional-level development efforts might best be 
coordinated to ensure that national as well as regional goals are met. Across a 
range of countries, growing stress is being placed on policy coordination – at the 
national level, in the regions and between the centre and the regions. 
The various national-regional coordination mechanisms which have been 
introduced fall into three broad (and sometimes overlapping) categories. 
• First, there are those, like the GA in Germany, where the aim is to ensure 
that, in a situation of devolved policy responsibilities, the scope for policy 
conflict is limited. 
• Second, there are those, like the Regional Growth Programmes in Sweden, 
where the objective is to subject regional plans, programmes or initiatives to 
national review to make certain that regional-level developments are in line 
with national policy goals. 
• Third, there are those, like the national-regional covenants in the 
Netherlands, where the purpose is to try to make sure that national-level 
policy decisions take full account of regional priorities and needs. 
It remains to be seen, of course, just how effective these coordination initiatives 
will prove to be in practice. Policy coordination has long been a challenge for 
regional policymakers and is likely to continue to be elusive. 
Finally, and linked to the growing emphasis on policy coordination, the 
appropriate role of central government in regional economic development has 
increasingly come under review. In line with the move away from the centralised 
implementation of policy, the national level is increasingly concerned with policy 
frameworks, coordination mechanisms, value-for-money, the identification and 
dissemination of best practice and ensuring that, in an increasingly devolved 
policy environment, national policy goals continue to be met. 
2.2.4 More pressure on regional policy budgets 
A further important feature of recent regional policy developments is that, in a 
range of countries, regional policy budgets have come under pressure (often 
related to the operation of the Maastricht criteria and, more recently, the Stability 
and Growth Pact) and some centrally-administered, spatially-targeted incentives 
have been withdrawn (for instance, in Austria). At the same time, and reflecting a 
more general liberalisation of economic development policy, there has been a 
tendency to move away from business aid schemes. In their place is a range of 
non-aid-based instruments, including measures to improve the business 
environment, local infrastructure provision and, particularly, the development of 
regional-level strategies. In part, such changes reflect a shift in policy focus 
towards endogenous development with its emphasis on supply side measures. 
However, they are also a response to the already-mentioned stress on identifying 
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regional solutions to regional problems. This in turn has tended to lead to more 
integrated approaches, incorporating a wider range of policy instruments. 
2.2.5 Growing impact of EU policy frameworks 
It is clear that both the Regional Aid Guidelines and the Structural Fund 
Regulation have had a growing impact on Member State regional policy.  
Recent policy developments have seen the increased targeting of regional aid 
schemes in response to changes introduced by the Regional Aid Guidelines. 
Most Member States experienced significant cutbacks in aid area population 
coverage in 2000, a continuation of a trend which had been apparent for more 
than two decades previously. As a consequence, many Member States found it 
difficult to designate appropriate aid areas under the guidelines. In addition, far 
more rate discrimination was introduced between designated aid areas, while 
overall rate maxima were also cut, particularly in Article 87(3)(a) areas. While this 
has not had a direct impact on award rates in most instances (since aid ceilings 
historically have tended to be well above average rates of award), any future 
reductions in award maxima may well impact on the discretion available to 
Member States in making regional aid awards. 
These changes to regional aid regimes have been accompanied by moves in a 
range of countries towards non-aid-based policy instruments. Such 
developments have been underpinned by the Structural Fund Regulation which 
not only continues to emphasise support for the business environment but also, 
through its co-financing demands, creates a framework within which national and 
EU regional policy priorities tend to be aligned, certainly in those countries where 
Structural Fund budgets are significant (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, Italy).  
2.2.6 Developments in the new Member States 
One last point to make about national regional policy developments is that, within 
the new Member States, EU regional policy has tended to dominate regional 
policy debates, activities and resources. In the immediate post-1990 period, 
market economy based regional policies were slow to develop; instead, priority 
was given to political and macro-economic reforms at a time of scarce resources 
and national economic crisis. There was also a delay in the emergence of the 
spatial impact of reform, a lack of requisite institutional capacity and unresolved 
issues of territorial administrative reform. On the other hand, more recently, 
regional policy has been the focus of much greater attention. Increasing regional 
disparities and forthcoming EU accession have moved regional policy up the 
political agenda. Regional policies, in some form, are now in operation in each 
new Member State, relevant institutions are being created at national and 
regional levels and a range of policy instruments are in place. 
However, a number of persistent difficulties remain. First, and most crucially, 
there are only limited financial resources allocated to regional policy. This is 
perpetuated by the EU funding where, at least in some countries, such as 
Poland, the dominance of sectoral policy priorities leaves little scope for 
addressing regional policy objectives. Second, regionalisation is slow and partial. 
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For instance, although regional development strategies have been drawn up in 
the Czech Republic, the regions do not have dedicated regional policy resources. 
Third, a lack of co-ordination between government ministries and with other 
levels of governance is a recurring problem. Finally, and as already mentioned, 
EU regional policy has tended to dominate the agenda, potentially leading to 
tensions with national policy objectives. 
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3. EU REGIONAL POLICY – THE REFORM DEBATE 
3.1 Policy context 
Compared to national regional policies, EU regional policy has enjoyed relative 
stability for some 15 years, but is now entering a challenging and dynamic period 
of profound change. Within the current programming period, Structural Funds are 
being implemented in the EU-15 Member States under more difficult 
administrative conditions than ever before. Building on the lessons of previous 
programming periods, some regions (especially outside the cohesion countries) 
have sought to increase the effectiveness and legacy of EU spending by 
developing more detailed strategies and more sophisticated project generation 
and appraisal systems.  
Across the EU, decentralisation of implementation responsibilities has not been 
accompanied by the expected simplification. The stricter requirements for 
financial management, audit and monitoring have increased bureaucracy and 
administrative costs. In some Member States, n+2 is becoming a serious 
problem, with the possibility of large amounts of funding being decommitted at 
the end of 2003. Over the coming year, the outcome of the mid-term evaluations 
and reviews, the allocation of the performance reserve, and reprogramming for 
the remainder of the 2000-06 period will represent new challenges. 
For the new Member States, the challenge is to design and implement Structural 
Fund programmes for the first time. Despite experience with the pre-accession 
funds, and considerable investment in developing institutional capacity, it is clear 
that programming will involve a steep learning curve in this first period. The 
current state of play is that the first CSFs and SPDs for the 2004-2006 are being 
submitted to the EC.  
For those countries with Community Support Frameworks – Poland, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia – the CSFs and Operational Programmes have been 
submitted, with discussions ongoing in some cases about the admissibility of 
certain elements, prior to the development of negotiation mandates from 
June/July onwards. A similar situation applies to countries with SPDs – Cyprus, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia. Among the draft programmes being 
submitted, there appear to be significant differences in approach, with a high 
proportion of regional-based interventions in countries such as Poland and the 
Czech Republic, as well as in terms of policy priorities (variation in the relative 
balance of ERDF, ESF and EAGGF). 
Beyond the current implementation difficulties in both existing and new Member 
States, of greater longer term significance is the debate about the reform of EU 
regional policy after 2006. Over the past two years, a process of discussion 
among European institutions, Member States, regional and sectoral interest 
groups has been intensifying, through a mix of open debate at EU conferences 
and closed discussions within Council meetings. The specific positions of 
national governments on individual aspects of the reform debate are set out in 
the minutes of the Structural Affairs Working Group and the presentations to the 
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Informal Meeting of Regional Policy Ministers in Halkidiki18. The following 
sections provide an overview of the main issues driving the debate. 
3.2 Economic and social cohesion in an enlarged EU 
The principal challenge for EU regional policy concerns economic and social 
cohesion in an enlarged Union. Enlargement will lead to a severely imbalanced 
EU territory in terms of the widening disparities between Member States and 
especially between regions and the capacity of Member States to address 
regional problems. 
The magnitude of the challenge facing the EU is shown in Table 2. Across the 
new Member States acceding in 2004, GDP per head, as a percentage of the 
EU-15 average, ranges from 33.2 percent in Latvia to 79.5 percent in Cyprus. 
The figures for Romania and Bulgaria are less than 30 percent of the EU-15 
average. Moreover, it will be no easy task for these countries to achieve 
sufficiently high and sustained growth rates to enable convergence with the 
existing EU-15. The most recent economic assessment noted that, while growth 
appeared to be accelerating, at least in some countries19: 
for many countries, the acceleration is rather minor and, given the 
underlying forecast error, not significant. In other words, although 
macroeconomic stabilisation and structural reforms are well advanced in 
most candidate countries, they are not expected to lead to a sizeable 
acceleration of average growth trends compared to those that prevailed in 
the past few years.  
      Table 2: GDP growth and GDP per head in the accession countries 
 Average annual real 
growth rate 
GDP/head (PPS, in % of 
EU average) 
 1997- 
2001 
2002- 
2005 
 
2001 
 
2005 
     
Bulgaria 2.0 4.9 28.1 30.7 
Cyprus 4.2 4.2 79.5 84.7 
Czech Rep. 1.0 3.7 57.2 59.8 
Estonia 5.2 5.5 42.3 47.3 
Hungary 4.5 4.6 51.2 55.3 
Latvia 5.7 5.3 33.2 37.2 
Lithuania 3.1 5.5 37.6 41.7 
Malta 3.4 3.4 n/a n/a 
Poland 4.1 3.6 39.7 41.3 
Romania -1.0 5.1 25.2 27.8 
Slovak Rep. 3.3 4.2 46.4 49.8 
Slovenia 4.5 4.4 68.8 73.2 
Turkey 1.2 4.7 22.4 24.4 
EU 2.6  100 100 
                       Source: Directorate-General for Economic & Financial Affairs 
                                                
18 Summarised in: Presidency Conclusions of the Informal Ministerial Meeting for Regional Policy and 
Cohesion, Hellenic Presidency of the Council of the European Union, Halkidiki, 16 May 2003. 
19 EC (2002a) Evaluation of the 2002 pre-accession economic programmes of candidate countries, 
European Economy Enlargement Papers, No.14, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 
Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, November 2002. 
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These assessments suggest that, with the exception of the two island economies 
and Slovenia, it could take 15-20 years for many of the new Member States to 
reach even the current (EU-15) Objective 1 threshold. 
According to the latest EC figures20, in an enlarged EU, one-third of the EU’s 
population would be in countries with a GNP/head below 90 percent of the EU 
average, compared to a figure of one-sixth in the current EU. The ratio of income 
per head in the top and bottom 10 percent of regions would increase from 1:2.6 
in the EU-15 to 1:4.4 in the EU-25. The labour market situation is also less 
favourable in the new Member States: accession will lead to a reduction in the 
average employment rates and an increase in the unemployment rate. Regional 
disparities in both indicators would rise also. 
3.3 Responding to the Lisbon Agenda 
The challenge of economic and social cohesion has to be seen within the 
overarching EU policy priority of improving competitiveness. At the Lisbon 
Council in March 2000, the EU set itself the strategic goal “to become the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of 
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social 
cohesion”. Specific targets were subsequently established, such as increasing 
the employment participation rate from 64 to 70 percent by 2010 (Stockholm 
Council) and spending three percent of GDP on R&D and innovation, two-thirds 
from the private sector (Barcelona Council). Although some measures have been 
taken to reform labour, product and capital markets, to promote a knowledge-
based economy, to ensure environmental sustainability and encourage public 
sector efficiency, these efforts have so far been patchy. Further, in the context of 
slow or stagnant economic growth, the latest EC assessment on progress 
towards the Lisbon objectives states that21:  
the pace of reform has undoubtedly slackened and is now too slow and 
clearly insufficient. A marked acceleration of reform is required for the 
strategic Lisbon goal to become within reach. 
This assessment applies to the existing 15 Member States. For the ten new 
Member States and three Candidate Countries, there are additional challenges. 
The pre-accession economic programmes have been implementing structural 
reforms aimed at meeting the Copenhagen accession criteria and becoming as 
competitive as the current EU rather than the more ambitious Lisbon process. 
While some of the accession countries have undertaken reforms going beyond 
the accession requirements (in areas such as privatisation and fiscal reforms), in 
many cases the structural reforms needed to prepare for accession are judged to 
be incomplete, for example with respect to barriers to market entry, property 
rights, and the institutional and regulatory environment.22 Achieving the Lisbon 
goals will be much more demanding, given resource constraints and weaknesses 
                                                
20 EC (2003a) Second Progress Report on Economic and Social Cohesion, Communication from the 
Commission, COM(2003) 34 final,  Brussels, 31.1.2003 
21 EC (2003b) Annual Report on Structural Reforms 2003, Economic Policy Committee, European Economy 
Occasional Papers, No.3, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Commission of the 
European Communities, Brussels, April 2003, p.4. 
22 EC (2002a) op. cit. 
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in institutions and administrative capacity, especially in the context of the current 
downturn in growth rates.23 
Many of the Lisbon priorities need to be addressed through national economic 
and employment policies, eg. market liberalisation, competition policy, 
investment in R&D. However, there is currently no mechanism for linking the 
objectives of the Lisbon Agenda, and in particular its territorial aspects, with EU 
regional policy. The annual assessments undertaken by DG ECFIN for the EU-15 
(and planned for EU-25 from 2003 onwards) do not systematically or explicitly 
identify regional disparities in the indicators of competitiveness.  
An explicit link has been proposed by both the EC and many Member States as 
part of the reform debate, in some cases to justify a role for EU regional policy 
outside Objective 1 and in other cases as a means of prioritising Community 
intervention. Summarising the discussions during 2002 on Structural Funds 
reform, the Second Progress Report remarked: 
the Commission has noted that promoting the competitiveness of the 
regions, as required by the policy objectives of the Union defined at the 
Lisbon European Council and supplemented by the sustainable 
development dimension at the Göteborg Council, was very often 
mentioned as the objective to support. That objective could be reflected 
through stress on the factors contributing to competitiveness such as 
access, the diversification oif the productive structure, the knowledge 
society, innovation, R&D, the environment, employment, social integration 
and education and lifelong training, particularly in a context of economic 
and social restructuring stemming from the globalisation of the economy. 
3.4 Moving towards sustainable development 
Integral to the EU’s objectives for growth and competitiveness is the question of 
the sustainability of development. While the Lisbon agenda refers to “sustainable 
economic growth” and social renewal, the Gothenburg Council added a third, 
environmental dimension to the growth strategy. It also established a new 
approach to policymaking to ensure that the economic, social and environmental 
effects of all policies are taken into account in decision-making. Specific 
commitments were (re)affirmed, many with a regional dimension, relating to 
renewable energy, sustainable transport and the management of natural 
resources. 
The EU has undertaken a succession of initiatives to translate its international 
sustainability commitments into the European policy environment since the 
publication of the Brundtland Report in 1987, initially focusing on environmental 
actions and, from 1993, promoting the concept of sustainable development. 
These political priorities have been reflected in the progressively stronger 
                                                
23 EC (2003c) Structural Reforms in Candidate Countries: Trends, Challenges and the Lisbon Strategy, Note 
by the Commission Services for the Ministerial meeting between Ministers of economy and finance of 
Member States and Candidate Countries, Barcelona, 15 March 2002. 
Regional Policies After 2006: Complementarity or Conflict? 
 
European Policy Research Paper, No. 51    European Policies Research Centre 23
requirements of Structural Fund regulations over successive programming 
periods, fostered by critical evaluation and assessment by EC auditors.24  
The current (2000-06) generation of programmes are subject to the most 
systematic and extensive requirements concerning the integration of 
environmental sustainability within the design and delivery of programmes. 
However, research suggests that progress is very uneven.25 Opportunities for 
‘positive action’ are frequently provided, and there is evidence of a 
‘mainstreaming’ approach in some programmes, but the operationalisation of 
commitments is proving to be complex and challenging. This applies in particular 
to programmes that aim to go beyond environmental improvement to an 
integrated approach to the economic, social and environmental sustainability of 
interventions.  
The experience of the first years of the current programme period indicates that a 
‘step change’ will be needed in learning, commitment and practice if the 
Structural and Cohesion Funds are to achieve the ambitious and integrated 
response required by the Gothenburg objectives of sustainable development.26 
This challenge is again magnified in the case of the new Member States where 
there is still a legacy of environmental degradation from the pre-transition era and 
a significant shortfall in the investment necessary to meet modern EU 
environmental standards. The increased allocations under the Cohesion Fund 
are particularly important for making progress in this area. 
3.5 Establishing the budgetary parameters 
The degree to which EU regional policy is able to respond to these challenges 
and policy priorities will be determined by budgetary constraints. The period of 
successive increases in EU regional policy was brought to an end by the 
agreement reached at the Berlin Council meeting in March 1999. In the context 
of enlargement, this agreement is important for two reasons: one is that it is a 
key Commission principle that the funding of enlargement in the period to 2006 
must respect the global budgetary ceilings agreed at Berlin;27 the other is that the 
Berlin financial perspective in 2006 provides the starting point for the next 
financial perspective covering the 2007-13 period. Past budgetary agreements 
have shown the importance of such base year figures for the subsequent flow of 
funds. 
Since Berlin, a number of changes to the financial perspective have been 
proposed with a view to accommodating enlargement to EU-25 in 2004. Initial 
amendments were set out in a Communication from the Commission in January 
                                                
24 Clement K and Bachtler J (2000) ‘European perspectives on the integration of environmental and  
protection and economic development’, in A Gouldson and P Roberts (Eds.) Integrating Environment and 
Economy, Routledge, London, pp.25-38. 
25 Taylor S, Polverari L and Raines P (2001) Mainstreaming the Horizontal Themes into Structural Fund 
Programming, IQ-Net Thematic Paper 10(2), European Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, 
Glasgow. http://www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/iqnet/iq-net/downloads/IQ-Net_Reports(Public)/10.2Horizontal%20Themes.pdf 
26 Clement K, Hansen M. and Bradley K (2003) Assessing Environment and Sustainable Development 
Integration in the Nordic Structural Funds, forthcoming report, Nordic Centre for Spatial Development, 
Stockholm. 
27 Speech by Günter Verheugen, Maastricht, 4 March 2002 
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2002.28 Subsequently, the Brussels European Council agreed on maximum 
levels for agricultural direct payments and market-related expenditure each year 
over the 2004-2013 period and set a ceiling for Structural and Cohesion Fund 
payments to the new Member States over the 2004-2006 period.29 More recently, 
the Copenhagen European Council concluded the accession negotiations and 
endorsed ‘the result of the negotiations which have determined expenditure 
requirements resulting from the accession of new Member States respecting the 
ceilings for enlargement-related expenditure set out for the years 2004-2006 by 
the European Council in Berlin.’30 Following on from this agreement, a revised 
financial perspective was produced in February 2003.31  
A basic point is that the commitment appropriations in 2006 set out in the 
financial perspective adjusted for enlargement (see Table 3) seem likely to 
provide a benchmark for expenditure projections over the 2007-13 period. This 
has already been agreed with respect to heading 1a of the financial perspective 
(relating to CAP expenditure but not including rural development support).  
          Table 3: Financial perspective EU-25 (€billion 1999 prices) 
COMMITMENT APPROPRIATIONS 2006 
1. AGRICULTURE 45.807 
1a Common Agricultural Policy 39.612 
1b Rural development  6.195 
2. STRUCTURAL OPERATIONS 37.940 
Structural funds 32.608 
Cohesion funds 5.332 
3. INTERNAL POLICIES 7.972 
4. EXTERNAL POLICIES 4.610 
5. ADMINISTRATION 5.712 
6. RESERVES 0.400 
7. PRE-ACCESSION AID 3.120 
8. COMPENSATION 0.940 
TOTAL COMMITMENT APPROPRIATIONS  106.501 
TOTAL PAYMENT APPROPRIATIONS 103.840 
Ceiling, appropriations for payments as a % of GNI (ESA 95) 1.06 
Margin for unforeseen expenditure 0.18 
Own resources ceiling (% of GNI) 1.24 
Source: EC (2003c) op. cit. Annex Table 1a 
Further, and as underlined by both the Brussels and the Copenhagen European 
Councils, the general stress on enhancing budgetary discipline will continue into 
and through the new financial perspective. This suggests that there will be 
resistance to expenditure streams increasing in real terms, certainly within EU-
15. Clear evidence of this can be seen in the decision of the Brussels European 
Council to cap future, market-related expenditure and direct payments to farmers 
within EU-25 at a specific nominal amount each year derived from the 2006 
                                                
28 EC (2002b) Information Note : Common Financial Framework 2004-2006 for the Accession Negotiations, 
Communication from the Commission, SEC(2002) 102 final, Brussels, 30 January 2002 
29 Commission of the European Communities, Brussels European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 24-25 
October 2002 (DOC/02/14) 
30 Commission of the European Communities, Copenhagen European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 12-
13 December 2002 (SN 400/02), Annex I: Budgetary and Financial Issues 
31 EC (2003d) Proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and Council on the adjustment of the 
financial perspective for enlargement, Commission of the European Communities. COM(2003) 70 final, 
Brussels, 11 February 2003 
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commitment appropriation increased by just one percent per year. This compares 
with the two percent per year increase allowed for over the 2000-06 financial 
perspective. Certainly, as far as direct payments to farmers and market-related 
expenditure is concerned (heading 1a of the financial perspective), the 
framework agreed at the Brussels European Council suggests an ongoing 
squeeze on CAP expenditure commitments within EU-15.  
With respect to structural operations, a range of parameters seems likely to 
influence the financial envelope for the 2007-13 period and how resources will be 
allocated between the Member States.  
• The commitment allocation for 2006 (or a figure closely related thereto). 
On the basis of the agreement reached at the Copenhagen European 
Council, this is €29,170 million for EU-15 and €8,770 million for the new 
Member States, a combined total of €37,940 million in 1999 prices (see           
Table 3).  
• The current ceiling on structural operations spending, 0.45 percent of EU 
GDP. The Commission regards this percentage as a “minimum below 
which the credibility of future cohesion policy would be called into 
question”,32 but across the EU there are widely differing views on the 
appropriate level of expenditure in relation to EU GDP.  
• The absorption cap for structural spending in the new Member States, set 
at four percent of GDP for the 2004-06 period.  
• The levels of aid per head for different categories of area. In this context, 
the January 2002 information note makes the point that the adjusted 
commitments for structural operations contained therein ‘imply that, after 
applying the capping of 4% of GDP as stipulated in the Community 
acquis, the aid per capita for structural expenditure in favour of the new 
Member States would attain €13733 per capita in 2006. This compares to 
an average of €23134 for the existing four Cohesion Countries.’35 
However, there was a subsequent (10 percent) reduction in structural 
operations commitments to the new Member States at the Brussels 
European Council and a further 5 percent cutback in Copenhagen.  
• The split between the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund will also 
have an impact. The Brussels European Council agreed that one third of 
the overall allocation for structural operations in the new Member States 
would be devoted to the Cohesion Fund, well in excess of EU-15 levels. 
As noted above, there are wide-ranging differences in viewpoint on the budgetary 
debate among Member States and European institutions. The polarisation of 
views is clear from the conclusions of the Halkidiki Ministers’ Meeting:36 
                                                
32 EC (2001) Unity, solidarity, diversity for Europe, its people and territory, Second Report on Economic and 
Social Cohesion, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 2001. 
33 This represents nearly 2.5% of total GDP of the new Member States. 
34 This represents 1.6% of total GDP of the four Member States that currently benefit from the Cohesion 
Fund. 
35 EC (2002b) op. cit. 
36 Presidency Conclusions of the Informal Ministerial Meeting for Regional Policy and Cohesion, Hellenic 
Presidency of the Council of the European Union, Halkidiki, 16 May 2003. 
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Most of the Member States consider that the level of financing of 
Cohesion Policies should take into account that, in the enlarged EU, the 
funding needs of these policies would be greater than at present. As for 
the level of financing of the Cohesion Policies while some countries 
support an increase in resources, others consider that financing should be 
at the level of 0.45% of EU-GDP, and others think it should be set at a 
lower level. A number of Member States suggested to address the issue 
in terms of absolute amounts. Moreover the level of funding should be 
decided in the wider context of the new financial perspective including the 
allocation of funds. The Commission considers the level of 0.45% of EU 
GDP as a reference of credibility for the resources to be allocated to 
Cohesion Policies for the period after 2006. 
While the Cohesion Countries have advocated an increase in budgetary 
resources to deal with the greater scale of economic and social disparities arising 
from enlargement37, some of the net contributor countries have advocated 
reductions in the level of EU spending on regional policy38; for its part, the EC is 
advocating that the current ceiling (0.45 percent of EU GDP) should be retained 
for spending on structural actions. As an indication of the range of possible 
expenditure, the EU regional policy budget for 2006-2013 could be some €270 
billion if based on an ‘absolute amount’ (using spending in 2006 as a reference 
point), but could be some €350 billion if calculated as a proportion of EU GDP 
(based on the 0.45 percent ceiling). 
3.6 Allocation of funding 
A further aspect of the EU regional policy debate concerns the way in which the 
budget might be allocated among the competing interests. The complexity of the 
issue can be illustrated by the different types of regional eligibility being 
considered for Structural Funds after 2006. 
The first category of regions are those regions which will qualify for Objective 1 
support because of a GDP per capita below 75 percent of the EU average in an 
EU-25. These are projected as comprising 25.5 percent of the population of an 
enlarged EU (compared to 12.1 percent in the EU-15). This assumes that the 
eligibility criterion for designating Objective 1 remains unchanged; some 
countries (eg. Finland and Spain) are lobbying for other criteria such as 
unemployment or population density to be included. 
Second, there are regions (‘Objective 1A’) that would qualify for Objective 1 in an 
EU-15 but would not be eligible in an EU-25 as a result of the ‘statistical effect’. 
                                                
37 Regional Policy and Enlargement, Memorandum by the Spanish Government to the European 
Commission, 2001. Address by Elisa Ferreira, Portuguese Minister of Planning, to the Second European 
Cohesion Forum, Brussels, 21-22 May 2001. Future Regional and Cohesion Policy: Meeting the Challenge 
of Deepening the Enlarged EU, Memorandum of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, Hellenic Republic, 
February 2003. 
38 Speech by Mr Koch-Weser: Einige grundsätzliche Überlegungen zur Ausgestaltung der EU-Strukturpolitik 
in einer erweiterten Europäischen Union, Rede anlässlich der Konferenz “10 Jahre Europäische 
Strukturpolitik in Ostdeutschland – Bilanz und Perspektiven”, 17/18 October 2001, Magdeburg. Non-paper 
Dutch position on future Cohesion policy, IBO Group, The Hague, 25 April 2002. A modern regional policy 
for the United Kingdom, HM Treasury, Department of Trade and Industry, Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister, London, March 2003. 
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These are mostly in Germany but include significant proportions of the eligible 
population in Germany, Spain, the UK and Hungary. 
Third, there are regions that have hitherto benefited from special provisions. 
These comprise areas previously eligible for Objective 6 on the basis of low 
population density (in Finland and Sweden), and the outermost regions (French 
overseas departments, the Azores, Canary Islands and Madeira), which have 
been covered by Objective 1. Some of the areas in these categories would be 
eligible for Objective 1 status in an EU-25, some would be excluded by the 
statistical effect, and some would require further special provisions to qualify 
even in an EU-15. 
Fourth, there is the question of the transitional arrangements that should apply to 
those regions, which would lose eligibility for Objective 1 even in an EU-15 by 
virtue of regional growth. This situation applies primarily to areas in Greece and 
Ireland, and also to Spain to a significant degree. The main issue here is whether 
transitional arrangements should be comparable to the six-year phase-out 
arrangements for de-designated Objective 1 regions in the 2000-06 period. 
Lastly, the EU is debating whether support should be provided for other areas 
outside the less-developed areas (which have currently received Objective 2 and 
3 assistance) as well as support under the Community Initiatives. While the 
continuation of initiatives such as Interreg is generally uncontested, there are 
diverse views on a future ‘Objective 2’, with respect to: 
• the proportion of funding that should be allocated to non-Objective 1 
areas 
• the regional priorities for the assistance (eg. the EC has proposed 
innovation and the knowledge economy, employability and social 
cohesion, sustainable development, accessibility, and rural development); 
and  
• the process for designating the areas eligible for support (eg. enabling 
zoning to be determined at Member State or sub-national levels). 
In addition to eligibility for Structural Funds, there is also the allocation of the 
Cohesion Fund to be considered. Assuming that the same criterion for eligibility 
(per capita GNP less than 90 percent of the EU average), all the new Member 
States except for Cyprus would qualify. Among the EU-15, Greece and Portugal 
would also qualify, Ireland would definitely be excluded, and Spain appears to be 
a borderline case, with a strong possibility that it might be excluded as a result of 
the ‘statistical effect’. 
3.7 A new implementation model? 
In addition to budgetary issues, the reform of the Funds has to be seen in the 
context of the current debate about the future governance of the EU, notably the 
powers and responsibilities allocated to EU, national and subnational levels. 
There are competing models of whether and how policy tasks (such as regional 
policy) should be allocated primarily to one level or shared.   
The EC, other European institutions and many Member States and subnational 
interests support the current model of policymaking whereby the task of 
addressing economic and social cohesion is shared among European, national 
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and subnational levels. They consider that the EU level should continue to have 
an active involvement in regional policy throughout the EU, on the grounds of 
solidarity and to ensure that EU regional policy does not become a kind of 
‘welfare policy’ restricted to supporting the poorest countries and regions.  
A fundamentally different approach to EU regional policy has been advocated by 
countries such as the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom, which 
consider that the current approach is no longer sustainable. The Dutch 
government has suggested an EU regional policy based on a national eligibility 
criterion39. A more fully developed proposal is contained in a UK consultation 
paper40 which put forward an ‘EU framework for devolved regional policy’. This 
foresees broad policy objectives being established at European level (based on 
the Lisbon agenda) but with the implementation of these objectives being 
undertaken by the Member States and regions without the transfer of EU 
resources.  
A further aspect of the implementation debate concerns the simplification of 
systems and procedures for administering structural actions.  This discussion 
was initiated in October 200241, with a ministerial meeting to consider how 
implementation of the Funds might be simplified in the current period as well as 
longer term after 2006.  For the post-2006 period, possible changes have been 
mooted to rationalise the stages of programming, possibly through some kind of 
contractual arrangement between the EC, Member State and region. Greater 
flexibility for Member States to select priorities from a menu of EU policy priorities 
for interventions outside Objective 1 is also being discussed. The key question is 
how to ensure that the EC can discharge its responsibilities to account for the EU 
budget to the Council, Parliament and Court of Auditors while increasing the 
flexibility and simplicity of administration at Member State level. A range of 
systemic and procedural simplification issues is also being considered (some of 
which should apply to the remaining years of the current programming period) to 
rationalise the administrative time and cost associated with audit, reporting and 
financial management. 
3.8 The effectiveness and ‘added value’ of policy 
Finally, the future course of EU regional policy is being influenced by perceptions 
of the effectiveness of the Structural and Cohesion Funds. The issue of 
‘Community added value’ has been particularly prominent in the debate, both in 
judging the effects of current and past programmes as well as assessing 
priorities for the future. As the EC noted in the Second Cohesion Report 42:  “a 
future reform of cohesion policies should ideally take the opportunity to increase 
the added value and the visibility of Community policy”. 
Clearly, Structural Fund programmes have had tangible net economic impacts in 
the cohesion countries and other large Objective regions. Outside these areas, 
                                                
39 Cabinet Standpoint concerning the Interdepartmental Policy Study on “EU Structural Policy in the Context 
of the Enlargement of the EU”, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance and Ministry for Foreign 
Trade, The Netherlands, 2001. 
40A Modern Regional Policy for the United Kingdom, HM Treasury, Department of Trade & Industry, and 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, United Kingdom, March 2003. 
41 Note on the simplification, clarification, coordination and flexibility of Structural Fund management in the 
period 2000-06, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, October 2002. 
42 EC (2001) op. cit. 
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the economic impacts are difficult to quantify.  However, the Funds have clearly 
enabled additional economic activity to take place, and there is evidence of 
programmes improving the quality of economic development and acting as a 
catalyst for regeneration. 
More broadly, recent research on Community added value suggests that EU 
regional policy has several important qualitative effects.43 First, programmes 
have influenced the deployment of resources for economic development, in 
particular at local level. They have enabled a wider range of organisations to 
engage in economic development and focused intervention on the needier areas.  
The Funds have safeguarded or increased the level of domestic regional 
development spending, and encouraged forward-looking regional development 
strategies. An important intangible effect of the Structural Funds is to make the 
EU more visible to citizens, communities, businesses and public authorities. 
Second, the EU programming approach has promoted a strategic dimension in 
regional development policymaking. Regional development has become more 
integrated and coherent, through the multi-sectoral and geographically focused 
approach of programmes. Multi-annual programming periods have also provided 
a more stable policy environment, allowing longer term planning. In several 
Member States, there is evidence that the lessons of EU programming are being 
transferred into domestic policies. 
There is mixed evidence of the influence of Structural Funds on domestic policy 
priorities. For the most part, the EU programmes do not appear to have ‘bent’ 
expenditure against the direction of national policy trends. However, they have 
played an important part in pioneering new types of intervention (in areas such 
as community economic development and the horizontal themes) and have been 
associated with institutional innovations in the management of regional 
development. 
Third, the most frequently cited area of added value associated with the 
Structural Funds is partnership. This fundamental principle of Structural Fund 
programming is considered to have brought enhanced transparency, co-
operation and co-ordination to the design and delivery of regional development 
policy, and better quality regional development interventions as a result.  The 
partnership principle is implemented in different ways across the EU, but the 
commonly perceived benefits of partnership are improved vertical coherence, 
stronger involvement of local actors, a greater awareness of the ‘bigger picture’, 
collaborative working and co-operation on economic development initiatives, and 
improved decision-making in the management of economic development 
interventions. 
Lastly, learning is an integral ingredient of Structural Fund programming. The 
Structural Funds have provided an exceptionally stable yet adaptable policy 
framework, which has promoted a dynamic of learning and innovation. In some 
regions, they have helped to institutionalise a ‘learning reflex’ as part of the 
routine delivery of regional economic development policy. 
                                                
43 Bachtler J and Taylor S (2003) The Added Value of Structural Funds, IQ-Net Special Paper, European 
Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/iqnet/iq-
net/downloads/IQ-NET_Reports(Public)/IQ_NET_Added_Value.pdf 
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Counteracting at least some of these trends, the added value contributed by the 
Structural Funds is undermined by some negative aspects of the programming 
environment.  Prominent among these is the burden of administration associated 
with operating the Funds, which affects not just administrators but also project 
implementers and final beneficiaries.  Other aspects of the detailed configuration 
of the Funds (including fragmented eligible area maps, the n+2 rule, and risk-
averse funding mechanisms) are believed to detract from their potential to 
encourage innovative and high quality interventions.   
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4. EU COMPETITION POLICY – A NEW PHASE 
4.1 Evolution of EU competition policy control of State aid 
As with EU regional policy, EU competition policy control of State aid is entering 
a new phase. Although the extent of material change to date is modest, it is clear 
that the Commission recognises the need to modernise its handling of State aid 
discipline to reflect new realities. Chief amongst these is the impact of 
enlargement. In purely practical terms, expansion to 25 Member States creates 
major resource and linguistic difficulties and has thrown into sharp relief the need 
to focus on those measures that pose the greatest threat to competition. In 
addition, the liberalisation agenda has exposed new activities to international 
competition, highlighting the potential conflict between the universal provision of 
key services and the State aid rules. Further, the increasingly sophisticated 
range of policy instruments designed by national policymakers keen to operate 
‘close’ to the market poses new challenges to existing approaches to defining 
State aids and determining their compatibility with the Treaty on the basis of 
current frameworks.  
At macroeconomic and political levels, attitudes towards State aids have 
continued to shift. The Council of Ministers has taken a growing interest in 
curbing the scale and improving the efficiency of government intervention, 
reflected in the Stockholm Council commitment to less State aid spending overall 
and a reorientation of that expenditure towards “horizontal objectives of common 
interest, including cohesion objectives”44 and in the wider substance of the 
Lisbon agenda for economic reform, innovation and social cohesion.  
Successive European Councils have added little in the way of substance to the 
means of achieving the ‘less, but better’ objective, at least in terms of concrete 
commitments to reduce spending by the Member States. Nevertheless, the 
political climate has given an impetus to Commission action in the form of a 
series of ‘scoreboards’45 on State aid expenditure, a progress report on the 
reduction and reorientation of State aid46 and an emerging policy reform 
agenda.47 
Several important themes have emerged from recent Council conclusions and 
Commission reports and statements: 
• a consideration of the role of market failure in the justification for State aid; 
                                                
44 Presidency Conclusions, Stockholm European Council, 23 and 24 March 2001. 
45 The most recent being European Commission, State Aid Scoreboard – Spring 2003 update, COM(2003) 
225 final of 30 April 2003, Brussels. 
46 EC (2002c) Progress report concerning the reduction and reorientation of State aid, European 
Commission COM(2002) 555 final of 16 October 2002. 
47 RAPID Press Release, Mario Monti, Contribution of competition policy to competitiveness of European 
economy, Institute of European Affairs, Dublin, SPEECH/03/264 of 26 May 2003; Philip Lowe, Objectives of 
State aid policy in the European Union and in the international context, Information seminar for MPs of the 
Candidate Countries on EC State aid policy, European Parliament, 26 May 2003. 
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• an emphasis on the efficiency and effectiveness of State aid and, related, a 
growing interest in evaluation and exchange of experience; 
• a Commission commitment to consider the feasibility of developing economic 
criteria for assessing State aid impacts; 
• efforts to simplify, modernise and clarify the State aid rules. 
These themes seem likely to impact on the future relationship between regional 
State aid and competition policy, although how precisely they might interact is 
likely to be the subject of considerable debate. 
4.1.1 More stress on the role of market failure in the justification of State aid 
Recent developments in State aid control have given greater prominence to 
market failure arguments in the justification for State aid. On the one hand, it has 
been stressed that State aids should be targeted at clearly identified market 
failures.48 On the other hand, the Commission has emphasised the need to 
question whether State aid is always the most appropriate response to market 
failures. For example, it has been argued that Member States “should assess, on 
a case-by-case basis, whether existing market imperfections affecting SMEs 
would be better addressed through the provision of state aid, advisory and 
information services, the intensification of structural reforms, or a combination of 
these measures.”49 
4.1.2 Greater emphasis on the efficiency and effectiveness of State aid and on the role 
of economic analysis in State aid control 
A related question is that of the efficiency and effectiveness of State aid. The 
Commission has procured external research that aims, inter alia, to draw up a list 
of criteria that make it possible to assess the circumstances in which aid is likely 
to be more or less effective.50 For their part, at the November 2002 
Competitiveness Council, the Member States undertook to improve the exchange 
of experience on a range of issues, including ex ante and ex post evaluations of 
State aid. 
The role of economic analysis in State aid control is also rising up the 
Commission’s agenda. Two main factors appear to underpin this. First, the 
Commission has been sensitive to criticism of its hitherto rather formalistic 
approach. Philip Lowe, the new Director General of DG Competition, has 
observed that “there is the impression that we are simply applying rules which 
aim to curtail state aid as such rather than concentrating on controlling aid which 
really distorts the European single market”.51 Second, the impact of enlargement 
                                                
48 2467th Council meeting – Competitiveness (Internal Market, Industry, Research) – Brussels, 26 November 
2002, 14365/02 (Presse 360). 
49 European Commission, State Aid Scoreboard – Spring 2002 update, COM(2002) 242 final of 22 May 
2002, Brussels. 
50 EC (2002c) op. cit. 
51 Philip Lowe, ‘Introduction’, EC Competition Policy Newsletter, 2003(1) Spring. 
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on resources means that greater priority needs to be given to those measures 
that have the greatest impact on EU competition and trade.  
There are two levels of analysis at which the role of economic criteria are 
relevant. First, the decision about whether a measure is caught by Article 87(1) at 
all – ie. does it constitute State aid? The key question in this context is whether a 
measure, inter alia, distorts or threatens to distort competition or affect trade 
between Member States. It has been observed that the Commission 
interpretation of Article 87(1) almost amounts to a per se rule: “if aid is granted, 
the conclusion that the aid distorts competition is almost automatic”.52 Some 
recent cases have suggested a rather more reasoned approach to finding 
impacts on intra-Community trade.53 Nevertheless, these few cases do not 
amount to a relaxation of the definition of what constitutes a State aid and policy 
is inevitably constrained by existing jurisprudence and precedent. 
The second level of analysis concerns the severity of the distortion involved. 
Philip Lowe has suggested that work could be undertaken on the economic basis 
for a distinction between aid that is particularly harmful and aid that, although it 
falls within the scope of Article 87(1), does not significantly distort competition 
and trade.54 This in turn could be reflected in procedural reforms that might ease 
the burden of examining less significant cases but identify those where closer 
scrutiny were merited.55 
There are two main precedents for adjusting levels of scrutiny or control to the 
perceived risk to competition. At the ‘bottom’ end of the spectrum, the 
introduction of the de minimis facility in the early 1990s effectively limited the 
scope of Article 87(1), enabling aid subject to certain ceilings and conditions to 
escape the notification requirement.56 Although it has been suggested that it 
might be possible to extend the de minimis Regulation (presumably by raising the 
threshold), a sui generis block exemption Regulation is thought to be a more 
likely route.57 
At the ‘top’ end of the spectrum, the Commission has sought to constrain the 
scale of regional investment aid to large projects under the Multisectoral 
Frameworks. For most activities, the 1998 Multisectoral Framework58 applies until 
end 2003 when the 2002 Multisectoral Framework59 enters into force for all 
                                                
52 Evans A and Martin S (1991) ‘Socially acceptable distortions of competition: Community policy on State 
Aid’, European Law Review, 79-111. 
53 For example, the Dorsten Swimming Pool case, which has been highlighted by the Commissioner as an 
instance in which the definition of aid has been more tightly circumscribed – see Mario Monti, ‘Services of 
General Interest in Europe’, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (EuZW), Vol 6/2001, p161; 24 
March 2001; a similar conclusion was reached in the Brighton Pier case – see Aids N 560/01 and NN 17/02 
– United Kingdom - Brighton West Pier, C(2002) 942 fin of 9 April 2002. 
54 Philip Lowe, op. cit. 
55 COM (2002) 555 at point 15. 
56 The de minimis facility is now enshrined in Council Regulation (EC) No 69/2001 of 12 January 2001 on 
the application of Article 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to de minimis aid, OJEC No L 10 of 13 January 2001. 
57 Philip Lowe, Handlungsspielräume der Wirtschaftsförderung der Länder nach der Erweiterung, Speech to 
the Ausschuss des Bundesrates für Fragen der Europäischen Union, Berlin, 6 December 2002. 
58 Multisectoral framework on regional aid for large investment projects, OJEC No C 107 of 7 April 1998. 
59 Multisectoral framework on regional aid for large investment projects – Rescue and restructuring aid and 
closure aid for the steel sector, OJEC No C 70 of 19 March 2002. 
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sectors.60 This will mean that, for projects involving eligible expenditure in excess 
of €50 million, a reduction matrix will be applied to the standard maximum award 
rates. In addition, very large awards will be subject to individual notification. Last, 
and perhaps most importantly, the 2002 Multisectoral Framework provides for the 
Commission to draw up a list of sectors where serious structural problems 
prevail; aid to firms in these sectors will be strictly limited. The Commission takes 
the view that the risk of distortion of competition is higher where a single 
company has a high market share and where production capacity is expanded 
without a corresponding increase in demand. A “systematic analysis” of the 
sectoral situation in the Community is underway with a view to drawing up a list 
of activities where such conditions prevail.61 
4.1.3 Steps to improve simplification, modernisation and clarification of the State aid 
rules 
A number of steps have been taken, or are envisaged, with respect to the 
simplification, modernisation and clarification of the State aid rules. In 2002 the 
Commission adopted a block exemption Regulation for employment aid,62 adding 
to the list of policy areas where reporting rather than prior notification are 
required. The Commission has also sought to clarify the relationship between the 
financing of services of general economic interest and the State aid rules,63 
although the outcome of this must await the European Court of Justice 
judgements in the Altmark and GEMO cases. Regarding enforcement and 
sanctions, the Commission has formalised its approach to complaints64 and 
indicated its intention that, in the future, reimbursement of unlawful state aid will 
be subject to interest at compound rates.65 More generally, the Commissioner 
has announced that the Commission is reviewing existing State aid control 
instruments with a view to simplification and elimination of potential conflicts 
between the texts.66 Together with the procedural Regulations adopted over the 
period 1999-2001, these changes amount to a substantial reform package. 
4.2 Developments in regional aid control 
Against this background, the control of regional aid appears to be in a quiescent 
period. The Commission has confirmed that the Regional Aid Guidelines 
introduced in 1998 are set to apply unchanged until 2006; however, it has also 
indicated that a review of the rules will be carried out “in due course” in order to 
enable the notification and approval of new assisted area maps for the period 
                                                
60 See ‘Regional aid and large investment projects’ in Wishlade F G (2003) Regional State Aid and 
Competition Policy in the EU (Kluwer Law International, The Hague), for an overview of the two Multisectoral 
Frameworks.  
61 COM (2002) 555 at point 12. 
62 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2204/2002 of 12 December 2002 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty to State aid for employment, OJEC No L  337 of 13 December 2002. 
63 DG Competition, Services of general economic interest and state aid, non-paper of 12 November 2002 
available from the DG Competition WebSite at: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/others/> 
64 Form for the submission of complaints concerning alleged unlawful State aid, OJEC No C 116 of 16 May 
2003. 
65 Commission communication on the interest rates to be applied when aid granted unlawfully is being 
recovered, OJEC No C 110 of 8 May 2003. 
66 Mario Monti, Contribution of competition policy to competitiveness of European economy, op.cit. 
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after 1 January 2007.67 DG Competition is conducting a ‘sounding out’ exercise 
involving externally-commissioned studies, bilateral discussions with the Member 
States and internal policy review. Commissioner Monti also wrote to all the 
Member States in April 2003 requesting any comments, observations or 
information relevant to a review of the Guidelines by 30 May 2003. In short, 
although the current guidelines will apply unchanged until 2006, regional aid 
control policy is due to undergo a period of intense scrutiny. 
No decision has apparently yet been taken on whether a radically new approach 
might be adopted post 2006 or whether small adjustments to the existing 
approach might suffice. What seems clear, however, is that maintaining the 
status quo is not a realistic long-term option68 and this for at least three reasons: 
first, the impact of enlargement; second, the outcome of the German legal 
challenge to the Commission Decision based on the guidelines; and third, the 
attitudes of national regional policymakers. Each of these factors has important 
implications for the future design of regional aid controls. 
4.2.1 The impact of enlargement 
The reality of eastern enlargement from 2004 radically alters the context for the 
logic which underpins the 1998 Regional Aid Guidelines. This takes as its starting 
point the notion that coverage of the national assisted areas should total less 
than half the Community population. Coverage for 2000-06 (set at 42.7 percent 
of the EU-15 population) was determined on the basis of predictions about 
enlargement during the period, coupled with an assessment of the minimum 
population coverage needed to enable ‘coherence’ between the national aid area 
and Structural Fund maps. A similar approach (but setting aside the issue of 
coherence) would imply coverage of up to 50 percent of the enlarged population. 
Moreover, equal treatment of the Member States would suggest the use of data 
covering an enlarged Europe in assessing regional disparities. 
A range of scenarios can be envisaged for incorporating the new Member States 
into the existing methodology.69 Whatever the scenario, the almost inescapable 
conclusion is that the impact on many current Member States would be 
significant and this on a number of levels. 
• Most obviously, the relative poverty of the new Member States would result in 
most of those countries being covered by Article 87(3)(a) in their entirety; this 
                                                
67 Commission Communication: Review of the guidelines on national regional aid for the period after 1 
January 2007, OJEC No C 110 of 8 May 2003. 
68 The Commission could, presumably, decide to extend the authorisation of the existing maps for a limited 
period pending the finalisation of new regional aid guidelines. 
69 For example, EU-25 data could be used throughout with further enlargement dealt with when it arose; 
alternatively EU-27 could be used as the basis for designation. Perhaps more persuasive and in line with the 
past, the population ceiling could be set on the basis of EU-27 population but GDP and unemployment could 
be assessed on the basis of EU-25 indices, pending further enlargement. There is, of course, the question of 
the overall population ceiling and whether 50 percent should be the absolute upper limit; on the other hand, 
the Commission might seek to exert further downward pressure on coverage. 
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uses a large proportion of the overall population ceiling, leaving considerably 
less for the current Member States.70  
• Many existing Article 87(3)(a) regions would be squeezed out of eligibility, not 
because their absolute position has changed but rather because of the 
statistical effect of enlargement on EU averages. This raises conceptual 
issues that are separate from those pertaining to eligibility for the Structural 
Funds. 
• Related, although overall Article 87(3)(c) coverage might rise within EU-15, 
this would not be enough to accommodate regions losing Article 87(3)(a) 
status unless the overall ceiling were increased. 
• The effects of enlargement would not be limited to spatial coverage but would 
also impact on rates of award, especially the scope of the 10 percent rate and, 
related, aid differentials in countries currently containing Article 87(3)(a) and 
(c) regions. 
• The impact of enlargement on the outcomes of the methodology vary widely 
between existing Member States, partly reflecting levels of unemployment (an 
indicator of questionable comparability), but also due to the impact of existing 
safety nets and the presence of absolute designation criteria which, unlike 
GDP per head, are potentially unaffected by enlargement (notably population 
density and the treatment of Northern Ireland). 
4.2.2 The German legal challenge to the Article 87(3)(c) adjustments 
A further impediment to simply rolling forward the guidelines post 2006 relates to 
the German legal challenge71 against the Commission Decision approving its 
assisted areas and the consequences of the case for the Guidelines.72 The 
essence of the German case concerned the ‘corrections’ made to the initial 
Article 87(3)(c) population quotas allocated under the Guidelines. These 
corrections involved ensuring that all countries: 
• had a minimum Article 87(3)(c) coverage of 15 percent outside the Article 
87(3)(a) areas; 
• had enough quota to cover all areas losing Article 87(3)(a) status and low 
population density areas; and 
• had coverage at least equal to 75 percent of their previous coverage. 
In order to remain within the overall population ceiling of 42.7 percent of the EU-
15 total, the coverage of Article 87(3)(c) areas was proportionately reduced in 
                                                
70 On the basis of EU-27 population and data and a 50 percent overall ceiling, EU-15 coverage could fall to 
36 percent of the population, compared with 43 percent at present – see ‘Enlargement and the Future of the 
Regional Aid Guidelines’ in Wishlade, F G (2003) op. cit. 
71 C-242/00 Federal Republic of Germany v Commission [2002] ECR I-05603. 
72 For a fuller discussion of the issues arising see ‘The Impact of Competition Policy on Regional Aid 
Policies’ in Wishlade F G (2003) op.cit.  
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any country not affected by these corrections. For Germany, this process 
involved the loss of some 5.8 percent of the national population from the Article 
87(3)(c) quota in order to ‘compensate’ other countries.73 
The German challenge was unsuccessful on essentially formal grounds. 
However, on substance, the Advocate General was critical of the political 
motivation for the corrections which partially overrode the analysis of regional 
disparities in a European and national context, and consequently breached the 
fundamental principle of equal treatment. The Court itself agreed that the case 
was inadmissible and did not consider the issues of substance, save to observe 
that it was still open for the German authorities to notify an additional list of 
regions covering the population lost through the correction process and for the 
Commission to assess whether the designation of these areas was compatible 
with the Treaty.  
Although the outcome of the case might be considered to be unsatisfactory from 
a German point of view, from the Commission perspective it is arguably even 
more so. At best, the Advocate-General’s views on the 1998 Guidelines create 
considerable uncertainty as to the legitimacy of the current method. It seems 
unlikely, as Philip Lowe has himself indicated,74 that such observations could be 
ignored in any review of the rules. 
4.2.3 Member State attitudes 
The third obstacle to continuing the status quo concerns the attitudes of the 
Member States. Although the Commissioner for Competition Policy pronounced 
himself content with the process of approving the assisted area maps,75 this 
sentiment was not widely shared among national policymakers, many of whom 
found the process very frustrating. The capacity of the Commission to exploit the 
lack of clarity in the Guidelines to its benefit was a particular irritation.76 Also 
important for future regional aid relations with DG Competition, many national 
policymakers were dismayed at the number and extent of the inconsistencies of 
interpretation of the Guidelines by the Commission, with considerable 
implications for transparency and the principles of equal treatment and the rule of 
law. How far the 1998-2000 experience impacts on Guidelines for the post-2006 
period will partly depend on the quality of national institutional memories; early 
indications are of much more intense preparations on the part of a number of 
Member States than took place last time, as well as of more contact between 
Member States on this issue. It seems likely that Member States will be much 
less willing to accept any future Guidelines unless they know precisely how they 
are to be interpreted in practice. 
                                                
73 Germany was not alone in this but was the only country to challenge the process. 
74 Philip Lowe, Handlungsspielräume der Wirtschaftsförderung der Länder nach der Erweiterung, Speech to 
the Ausschuss des Bundesrates für Fragen der Europäischen Union, Berlin, 6 December 2002. 
75 Rapid Press Release, Commission brings its review of regional policy to a successful conclusion with the 
approval of the maps for Belgium and Italy, IP/00/1024 of 20 September 2000, Brussels. 
76 See ‘Issues and Challenges: the Future of Regional Aid Control’ in Wishlade F G (2003) op.cit.  
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4.3 Future challenges 
Against this background, it is clear that the reform of regional State aid control 
faces a number of practical, conceptual and technical, not to mention political 
challenges. 
4.3.1 Practical problems 
At a purely practical level, time is short for a radically new approach. The present 
system was piloted over several years from the early 1990s; various versions 
were negotiated with Member States prior to adopting the Guidelines in February 
1998 for application from 2000. This practice had typified earlier developments in 
regional aid control, but is rendered more difficult by the formalisation of the rules 
under the Guidelines and the use of appropriate measures to impose them. Even 
a minimalist approach to change presents practical challenges. Member States 
are divided on the degree of change required and on their approaches to 
initiating change. The impact of the present Guidelines rolled forward varies 
widely between countries and may be significantly affected by relatively small 
statistical changes, such that precise outcomes cannot be known until the latest 
data become available. This was a significant practical issue under the 1998 
Guidelines; it may represent even more of a problem in the post-2006 period. 
4.3.2 Conceptual concerns 
At a conceptual level, the notion of ‘cohesion’ – and how competition policy 
control of State aids can best contribute to it – remains unclear. Since the early 
1990s, the emphasis has been on competition policy enabling, or at least not 
frustrating, the adoption of coincident maps for national and EU regional policies. 
However, this is arguably a rather superficial preoccupation that conceals the 
need for a more fundamental debate about the appropriate articulation of spatial 
policy objectives at different tiers of government. It can be argued that there is a 
need in principle to review the implications of the different Treaty provisions on 
competition and cohesion. The danger is that future discussions will instead 
become mired in practical questions about the treatment of transitional regions 
(those losing Article 87(3)(a) and/or Objective 1 status). 
Further conceptual challenges arise from incorporating aspects of the wider State 
aid reform agenda into regional aid control. The earlier discussion noted the 
growing interest in taking account of market failure in assessing State aids. 
Acceptance of the market failure justification for aid is implicit in the Treaty 
provisions; these ban State aid in principle, but derogate from this prohibition in a 
series of exceptions. However, the derogations do not explicitly require the 
identification of market failure in order for State aid to be justified. Further, the 
identification of a market failure does not, of itself, justify an exception to the 
general ban on State aid: Article 87(3)(c), which has formed the basis for most 
policy allowing the use of aid in derogation from the ban, merely refers to “aid to 
facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic 
areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent 
contrary to the common interest.” The identification of criteria to establish what is 
in the common interest remains elusive. Would evidence of market failure 
become a requirement for State aid authorisation? Would it be a necessary, but 
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insufficient condition for granting a derogation? Where would the burden of proof 
lie in market failure arguments for State aid? Would measures that in the 
Commission’s view were ineffective be outlawed even in the absence of 
significant competition concerns? 
4.3.3 Technical issues 
These conceptual concerns spill over into, and are difficult to disentangle from, a 
range of technical issues. At the heart of these are tensions between what is 
theoretically relevant and what is administratively feasible; between arbitrariness 
and relevance; and between transparency and politicisation. The regional aid 
control regime is easy to critique. Amongst other things, it can be argued that: 
• there is excessive emphasis on regulating the scope and extent of the 
assisted areas and insufficient analysis of the real effects of aid on 
competition and trade; 
• the spatial focus of regional aid control impacts on policy areas such as SME 
support or regeneration policies where the assisted areas approved may only 
be of partial relevance but where risks to trade and competition are minimal; 
• policy is ill-suited to assess the increasingly sophisticated range of policy 
instruments being operated, or to considering those which it has not 
previously sought to address.  
However, critics should be under no illusions about the technical difficulties 
involved in addressing these issues. There are important gaps in the 
understanding of just how State aids affect competition and trade that are not 
answered by the academic literature in ways that are of practical relevance. 
Even where policy has sought to address competition issues more directly (for 
example, under the motor vehicle aid rules or the 1998 Multisectoral 
Framework), the absence of relevant, comparative and up-to-date statistical data 
at an appropriate level of analysis has tended damage the credibility of policy. 
4.3.4 Political challenges 
Regional aid control also faces political challenges. From the outset, the role of 
the Council in State aid control has varied, with the Commission sometimes 
resisting Member State involvement and sometimes building on their apparent 
commitment to restraint. Recent developments suggest that State aid control is 
being considered more within the context of broader macroeconomic policy, 
reflected in the growing interest in overall levels of spend and the notion of 
introducing targets to limit spending. Whilst the Commission may welcome the 
support of the Member States as regularly expressed in Council conclusions, this 
support is less evident in individual cases where national interests are at stake. 
Moreover, the Commission may find increased Member State involvement in 
State aid policy formulation to be double-edged as countries float proposals that 
the Council, not the Commission, should decide on overall assisted area 
coverage or even that State aid control should be subject to Treaty change. 
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5. COMPLEMENTARITY OR CONFLICT? 
The previous three sections have considered the broad trends and issues 
relating to three areas of policy - national regional policies, EU regional policy, 
EU competition policy. A common theme is that of change. 
• National regional policies in many countries have been characterised as 
increasingly based on a new policy paradigm. 
• EU regional policy faces not only the challenge of enlargement but also 
the need to address some major governance issues within a changed 
policy context. 
• EU competition policy is confronting an ambitious reform agenda 
comprising not only substantive policy questions but also the practical 
realities of regulation within an expanded EU.  
In short, all three policy areas are undergoing, or about to enter, a period of 
significant reappraisal. The key question is how future policy interrelationships 
might evolve. This final section summarises these current policy relationships 
before considering whether future linkages are set to be more complementary or 
more conflictual in terms of four key aspects of policy: policy objectives; policy 
focus; policy governance and implementation; and policy instruments. 
5.1 Policy relationships 
The future of regional policy is influenced by a triangle of interrelationships 
between the three areas of policymaking. In part, these relationships are mutually 
reinforcing, but they are also subject to tensions and areas of conflict. Each of 
these interrelationships is worth considering in turn. 
5.1.1 EU competition policy and national regional policy 
The presence of a degree of tension in the relationship between EU competition 
policy and national regional policy is perhaps inevitable. It is, after all, a basic 
task of the EU competition policy authorities to control competitive distortions 
arising from the award of State aid, including national regional aid. That said, all 
Member States strongly support the Commission in this objective and, indeed, 
the Council has, in recent years, increasingly stressed the need for ongoing 
reductions in State aid spending across the EU. 
With respect to the control of regional aid, the main focus of the Commission was 
initially on the types of regional aid on offer, the aim being to eliminate support in 
the form of operating aid. However, over time, the extent and coverage of the 
designated aid areas took centre stage. As already mentioned, over the years, 
the interventions of DG Competition became more systematic, culminating in the 
development and subsequent implementation of the March 1998 Regional Aid 
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Guidelines.77 These focused particularly on the use of aid area population 
ceilings to enforce State aid discipline while, at the same time, offering Member 
States more latitude (in principle) in the actual selection of assisted areas within 
the population ceilings laid down.  
Despite the stated intention to give the Member States more flexibility in the 
designation of aid areas within the parameters laid down, Member States 
expressed varying levels of dissatisfaction with both the method for determining 
population ceilings and, particularly, with the subsequent map negotiations with 
DG Competition. Notwithstanding the pressure to agree new maps caused by the 
withdrawal of the previous maps at the end of 1999, agreement had been 
reached with only four countries by the start of 2000 (Ireland, Finland, Denmark, 
Greece). Half of the remaining Member States did not have their maps approved 
until June-September 2000. Moreover, a significant number remained unhappy 
with both the process and its outcome.78 
5.1.2 EU regional policy and national regional policy 
In the early years of EU regional policy, it was closely aligned with national 
regional policy and, indeed, took the form of supplementing national regional 
policy efforts through additional EU funding. Over time, EU regional policy 
gradually moved to make its contribution more distinctive, culminating in the 
reform of the Structural Funds in 1988 based on EU policy principles and EU-
determined support areas. Even so, in many Member States, and particularly 
those where Objective 1 regions tend to dominate, EU regional policy and 
national regional policy remained closely in tune; indeed, in many Member States 
they were (and remain) synonymous. 
However, in some Member States there were always certain tensions between 
EU and national regional policy, often stemming from the perception that the EU 
policy tail was driving, and even distorting national policy priorities. These 
tensions have increased over the years as EU regional policy has taken on board 
a wider range of (horizontal) policy objectives, which do not always find a 
resonance within national regional policy. Difficulties have also arisen as EU 
regional policy has become more spatially concentrated, often focusing on areas 
(urban, rural, fisheries) that may not be designated for national regional policy 
purposes. Moreover, in some countries, co-financing demands are considered to 
have distorted national policy goals. There is also a perception that the additional 
administrative burdens associated with the Structural Funds have detracted from 
national policy priorities and practices. 
5.1.3 EU competition policy and EU regional policy 
Up until the reform of the Structural Funds in 1988, there were no real tensions 
between EU competition policy and EU regional policy. Policy strains began to 
emerge when areas designated under the Structural Funds were not always 
approved by DG Competition for national regional policy purposes. For instance, 
                                                
77 EC (1998) Guidelines on national regional aid, Official Journal of the European Communities C74; 
10.3.1998, pp 9-31. 
78 For more details see Wishlade F, Yuill D and Méndez C (2003) Regional Policy in the EU: A Passing 
Phase of Europeanisation or a Complex Case of Policy Transfer? European Policy Research Paper No 50, 
European Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde. 
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DG Competition cast doubt on the designation of Abruzzi in Italy as part of the 
national aid area map shortly after it had been accepted as an Objective 1 region 
by DG Regio.  
The issue of coincident maps produced sharp internal divisions within the 
Commission in the early 1990s. While DG Regio argued that designation for the 
Structural Funds should be adequate justification for the Article 87(3)(a) or (c) 
derogation, DG Competition was concerned to limit the use of State aid, 
especially in the more prosperous Member States, in order to maintain an 
appropriate differential in relation to the poorer regions.  
Although the question of map coherence was downgraded for the 2000-06 
period, it remains a sensitive topic. The extensive recourse to the Structural Fund 
derogation in the 2000 aid area negotiations meant that a significant number of 
areas were designated for Structural Fund purposes simply so that they could be 
incorporated within national regional aid maps. 
5.2 Policy objectives: what does cohesion mean? 
At the heart of current and, perhaps future, policy tensions is uncertainty about 
what is meant by the cohesion objective and who defines it. In the absence of a 
concrete definition, the Treaty requirement that national and Community policies 
should contribute to the achievement of cohesion has been interpreted in a 
manner that emphasises the geographical coincidence of policy targeting. This is 
at the expense of considerations about appropriate policy coordination and the 
articulation of different levels of policy responsibility. At the same time, 
successive reports on the economic and social situation in the Community have 
noted convergence in GDP(PPS) per head between countries, but widening 
disparities within them. In parallel, an important shift in the targeting of Objective 
1 funding took place for the 2000-6 period with the notion of “cohesion countries” 
losing prominence in favour of a greater focus on poor regions, irrespective of the 
prosperity of the Member State in which those regions were located. 
In practical terms, the level of tension between regional policy at the national and 
EU levels varies considerably between Member States. Where Structural Fund 
eligibility is extensive, and focused mainly on Objective 1 (as in Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain) there is considerable synergy between national regional 
policy and EU structural policy; indeed, there is often no separately identifiable 
national regional policy in such countries. On the other hand, where the 
Structural Funds are less important – and, in particular, outside of Objective 1 – 
there tends to be far less synergy in respect of policy objectives. On the contrary, 
there is often considerable tension between the objectives of the Structural 
Funds and those of national regional policy, not least with respect to the 
Structural Fund’s horizontal priorities. In addition, the different elements of 
Objective 2 – industrial, rural, urban, fisheries – often have only limited overlap 
with the main focus of national regional policy.  
Looking to the future, there must be some concern that the list of objectives 
attached to EU regional policy will continue to grow (in part reflecting the Lisbon 
and Gothenburg agendas, but perhaps also in response to a menu-based 
approach to development priorities outside of Objective 1). Under such 
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circumstances, it is difficult to imagine current policy frictions being significantly 
eased. On the contrary, enlargement and the consequent increase in disparities 
between countries and regions can only heighten existing conflicts if current 
policy trajectories are pursued. Yet there would seem to be scope for greater 
complementarity of policy if the objectives of the respective policy areas were to 
be clarified, policy responsibilities refocused and the emphasis on detailed 
aspects of policy implementation reduced. 
An important issue is a tendency to perceive the pursuit of the cohesion objective 
in spatial terms with an emphasis on coincident maps at the EU and national 
levels. Enlargement and the focus on the relative positions of the regions of the 
EU for the purposes of both national and EU regional policies increases the 
likelihood of conflict. The focus on poor regions – namely Objective 1 - coupled 
with the political pressures both for special treatment of the ‘statistical effect’ 
regions and budgetary restraint, threatens to dilute the capacity of EU structural 
policy to target the worst-off parts of the EU. In parallel, the mechanistic effect of 
the existing population ceiling-based method of regional aid control would curtail 
the scope for national regional policies to intervene, not because the absolute 
position of the problem regions had necessarily improved, but rather because 
enlargement had altered their relative or apparent prosperity.  
On the other hand, there is a compelling case for EU structural policies to focus 
on disparities between countries, complemented by leaving primary responsibility 
for disparities within countries to the Member States and/or to subnational levels. 
For its part, EU competition policy could facilitate the ability of the Member States 
to address internal regional disparities by focusing attention on aid that distorts 
competition to an appreciable extent, and much less on precisely where it is 
offered in geographical terms. This would allow greater flexibility to Member 
States to assist firms in problem regions – whether ‘classic’ regional development 
areas, urban areas, rural areas, site reclamation etc.  
5.3 Policy governance: who should do what? 
A major theme of the current debate on governance in the EU has been that of 
subsidiarity and the appropriate level of policy formulation and implementation. At 
the same time, a review of recent developments in national regional policies 
makes clear that the respective roles and relationships of different tiers of 
government in economic development, is undergoing fundamental change. 
The key question is how the organisation of regional policy tasks should be 
determined at the European level.  On the one hand, there are arguments in 
favour of a clear delineation of policy responsibilities, based on the principle of 
subsidiarity. The organisation of regional policy in Germany is one model of this 
approach, whereby the responsibility for regional development is vested in the 
Länder, and the involvement of the federal government is only justified in areas 
which individual states cannot address themselves (eg. funding, co-ordination). 
The UK consultation paper on Structural Funds reform also advocates a clearer 
separation of responsibilities – between the determination of policy objectives 
(EU level) and the implementation of those objectives (national, subnational 
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levels) – to respect the new, regional-based approaches to national regional 
policy.   
On the other hand, critics of this approach argue that, in the context of multi-level 
governance, it is not possible (or even desirable) to separate and allocate policy 
tasks between levels of government. Politically, there is concern that EU regional 
policy would be weakened, in terms of resourcing and leverage, and that it would 
be difficult to ensure that EU policy objectives were in fact being fulfilled. 
A critical factor in this debate is what added value the European level can bring 
to regional policy. In countries or regions with significant development gaps 
relative to the rest of the EU, the value of financial transfers from the EU under 
Structural and Cohesion Funds to promote investment and employment is clear. 
There is also an undisputed policy regulation and control function in the field of 
State aid control.  
Beyond these areas of European involvement in regional policy, there is less 
consensus. Many would argue that EU funding provides important added value 
outside Objective 1 regions, as a concrete expression of solidarity, in making the 
EU visible to the citizen, in improving the process of economic development 
through the ‘Community method’, and in facilitating co-operation and the 
exchange of good practice. However, these arguments are not universally 
accepted, and the challenge for the Union is to identify ways in which the EU can 
demonstrate its added value in the new regional policy environment. 
5.4 Policy focus: is spatial targeting really the way forward? 
The evolution of EU competition policy control of regional aid has been 
dominated by different approaches to approving the assisted area maps of the 
Member States. European Commission intervention has tended to focus on 
seeking a justification from the Member States for targeting policy at particular 
geographical areas and viewing constraints on overall coverage as a measure of 
its success in achieving discipline. As discussed earlier, recent policy statements 
on State aid control suggest a growing role for economic analysis in the 
assessment of whether measures are compatible with the Treaty. In principle, 
this has the capacity to reduce conflict with the Member States over regional aid 
control while making the operation of competition policy more relevant to genuine 
trade and competition concerns. A further potential benefit would be the scope to 
disentangle State aid for other policy areas – such as regeneration aid – from 
considerations of whether the targeting of the measure coincided with the 
national regional aid map.  
Arguably, the corollary of this is that, if current approaches to regional aid control 
are simply extrapolated into the future, heightened tension seems inevitable. 
Most obviously, as discussed earlier, this will be the case with respect to 
designated aid area coverage, especially if a global ceiling in the region of 50 
percent or less of the enlarged population is chosen. Of course, it may be that a 
less ambitious global ceiling is set or that different allocation rules and 
mechanisms are developed, but it seems certain that the scope to aid Article 
87(3)(c) areas will be much reduced. This would be in line with the view within 
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DG Competition that regional aid is appropriate only when it contributes to EU 
cohesion; that is, only within Article 87(3)(a) areas. Indeed, the suggestion has 
been floated that, post 2006, investment aid for large firms should no longer be 
available in Article 87(3)(c) areas. This has obvious implications for the operation 
of national regional policy in many EU15 countries, most notably those where the 
tissue of SMEs alone is considered insufficient to sustain regional economic 
development. 
A further issue is that the spatial focus of the Structural Funds does not 
necessarily reflect the spatial priorities of national regional policy – in part due to 
the different objectives of policy, but also because of the growing tendency in 
some countries for national regional policy to take on a whole-country focus. The 
lack of coherence between EU competition policy and EU regional policy has 
been a significant area of policy tension over the past fifteen years. Coherence 
has been seen mainly in terms of map coincidence, with concern in DG Regio in 
particular that development efforts in Structural Fund areas would be undermined 
if regional investment support could not be offered. Prior to the 1988 reform of 
the Structural Funds, this was not an issue since EU regional support was built 
around the national regional policies (and aid areas) of the Member States. 
However, it became an important theme with the designation of EU-specific 
maps post 1988.  
There are a number of reasons for the lack of spatial coherence. One was that 
the typology of regions used under the Structural Funds was very different from 
the approaches adopted for national regional policy purposes (subject to EU 
competition policy approval). In particular, in many countries, regional aid areas 
have come to be associated with the attraction of inward investment, a very 
different target group from, for instance, the rural, fisheries and inner urban areas 
targeted under the Structural Funds. Moreover, as the coverage of both the 
Structural Fund and aid area maps has been reduced over time, not only has 
map coincidence become increasingly challenging but the pressures to 
compensate the loss of eligibility under one map with inclusion in the other have 
grown. It is noteworthy that, as Member States have gained more influence over 
the designation of Structural Fund areas outside of Objective 1, thus creating 
more scope for coherence, support for coincident maps has declined.  
Looking to the future, the indications are that the Commission will again stress 
the importance of spatial coherence post 2006, certainly with respect to Objective 
1 and Article 87(3)(a) areas. More generally, the scope for conflict arising from 
spatial targeting is likely to increase if the goals of coherence (map coincidence) 
and concentration (reduction of assisted areas coverage) are pursued. However, 
as noted earlier, increased conflict is not inevitable. Greater emphasis on the 
economic effects of State aid could reduce the spatial focus of competition policy 
approval of regional aid. This would diffuse some of the frustrations of national 
policymakers (lack of capacity to anticipate change; linkages across otherwise 
largely unrelated policy areas; interference in schemes posing minimal risks to 
competition and trade). At the same time, an EU structural policy that focused on 
disparities between Member States would largely eliminate the preoccupation 
with coincidence that permeates the current relationship between the national 
and the Structural Funds assisted areas. 
Regional Policies After 2006: Complementarity or Conflict? 
 
European Policy Research Paper, No. 51    European Policies Research Centre 47
5.5 Policy instruments: how to facilitate policy innovation? 
A significant area of tension is the capacity of existing policy frameworks to deal 
with innovative policy instruments.  
EU structural policies encourage innovative projects or those involving partners 
not habitually associated with economic development, but the rules indirectly 
inhibit the capacity of policymakers to take on such projects. Innovation, by its 
nature, inherently involves risk, but audit and other regulatory requirements push 
policymakers back towards projects and programmes which are more certain of 
absorbing expenditures and less likely to incur decommitment. The experience 
placed on financial engineering instruments in the current programming period 
indicates what might be feasible in future, but it also highlights some of the 
practical implementation and regulatory difficulties. 
In the context of policy instruments, an important strand of competition policy 
control of regional aids has been concerned with ‘incentive type’. Accession to 
the EU has typically been accompanied by a review and enforced revision of the 
forms of regional aid on offer, ostensibly to meet the needs of transparency and 
comparability and to outlaw and/or constrain what are perceived to be the most 
damaging forms of aid, notably intra-EU export aid and operating aid.  This has 
often been a significant area of tension – the most recent example being the use 
of transport aid and social security concessions in the Nordic Member States. 
(State aids have also been one of the most intractable issues in the negotiations 
with the new Member States.) The existing approach that essentially prohibited 
the use of operating aid on an ongoing basis failed to take account of the 
permanent nature of the handicaps facing the target regions. Moreover, new 
rules introduced in response forced national policymakers to reverse-engineer 
existing measures, including transparent and automatic labour-market 
instruments, into a form of transport aid. 
More generally, competition policy has tended to reinforce the use of grant-based 
aid where many countries (and indeed Structural Funds co-financed measures) 
have tried to move to solutions that are closer to the market and, in principle, 
involve forms of support that operate where the market does not. In some cases, 
the effects of Commission intervention have been perverse, with forms of 
government intervention involving higher sums escaping scrutiny while some 
instances of so-called ‘gap funding’ (where public authorities have intervened in 
the absence of a functioning market) has been outlawed.  
As already mentioned, a potential source of conflict lies in the relationship 
between the State aid rules and services of general economic interest; the 
delicate balance between the free-market orientation of the Treaty provisions and 
public service considerations is of crucial importance for regional development 
policies. The French and German national consultative bodies on regional 
development recently underlined the need for competition policy to be sufficiently 
flexible to enable Member States to address regional inequalities or specific 
problems resulting from trade liberalisation and that it should not threaten the 
provision of services of general economic interest on which regional economic 
competitiveness depends. It remains to be seen what the consequences of 
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pressures to take forward Article 16 of the Treaty and the pending Court cases 
will be for State aid and regional policy relations.  
As noted earlier, recent policy statements on State aid control suggest a growing 
role for economic analysis in assessing whether measures are compatible with 
the Treaty. In principle, this approach has the capacity to reduce conflict with the 
Member States over regional aid control while making the operation of 
competition policy more relevant to genuine trade and competition concerns.  
In reality, Commission attempts more directly to address regional aid measures 
that have potentially significant impacts on competition have often been opposed 
by Member States; in particular, proposals to target regional aid for capital 
intensive projects were resisted and diluted by the Member States in the 1990s 
before being partially subsumed into the 1998 Multisectoral Framework. The 
increased restraint implied by the 2002 Multisectoral Framework continues to be 
opposed by some countries. Thus, technical challenges are not the only obstacle 
to improving the relevance of frameworks to the regulation of policy instruments. 
5.6 Concluding points 
This final section has outlined a number of sources of tension in the relationship 
between national and EU regional policy and EU competition policy, highlighting 
the scope for future policy change and the impact of enlargement to render those 
relationships more conflictual. Importantly, however, it has been argued that 
greater conflict is by no means inevitable and that a fundamental review of policy 
objectives, policy focus, policy responsibilities and the relationship between 
policy instruments and regulatory frameworks could, in fact, improve the 
complementarity of the policy areas rather heighten tensions. 
It is perhaps unrealistic to imagine that such potentially radical considerations are 
really on the agenda. In the words of one observer:  
“policy is made in turf battles between … bureaucracies, such that 
policymakers are often far more concerned with enhancing their power 
than with solving a problem. So policies tend to be ineffective, 
incremental, and incoherent”79 
Of course, the tenor of the relationship between national regional policy, EU 
cohesion policy and EU competition policy does not lie in the hands of the 
Commission alone. Moreover, each of the three policy areas is not only multi-
faceted in the objectives it seeks to address but also in the political pressures to 
which it is subjected. Precedent is a powerful driving force in EU policy evolution 
and many Member States are likely to prefer the comfort of minor and relatively 
predictable adjustments to an existing approach (however unsatisfactory) to a 
radical overhaul that seeks to address the underlying objectives of policy. 
However, while policy change may be incremental, it should not lose sight of the 
potential offered by greater effectiveness and coherence. 
                                                
79 Hooghe L (1996) Cohesion Policy and European Integration, OUP, Oxford. p93. 
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6. REGIONAL POLICIES AFTER 2006: SEMINAR DISCUSSION 
6.1 Introduction 
The preceding paper provided the basis for a Sub Rosa ‘Strategic Discussion’ 
held at Scotland House on 13-14 June 2003. This seminar was attended by c.60 
representatives of European institutions, Member States, Accession Countries, 
regional institutions and academic bodies.  Participants attended in a personal 
capacity and it was agreed that individual contributions to the discussion would 
not be attributed. On this basis, the following section should be regarded as a 
review of the discussion and does not represent a common or agreed set of 
conclusions. 
The distinctive feature of this seminar on the future of EU regional policy was that 
it looked at broader policy influences and relationships between national regional 
policy, EU regional policy and EU competition policy. 
The starting point was a general consensus that EU regional policy will continue 
in an enlarged EU, if only because assuring cohesion is a Treaty obligation and 
the Structural and Cohesion Funds are the designated instruments in the Treaty. 
However, the philosophy, scale, spread, the instrument and the interrelationship 
with other policies are open to debate. On the one hand, there are critics of 
regional policy who believe that the solution to regional problems is largely to rely 
on market mechanisms (especially private capital flows), and that regional policy 
is ineffective and wasteful. On the other hand, there are equally strong 
arguments in favour of retaining EU cohesion policy on the basis of evidence that 
the policy works and continues to be needed in the interests of European 
integration and solidarity.  
Discussion at the seminar was organised around four sets of questions, each of 
which is summarised below in turn: 
• –Policy objectives: what does cohesion mean? 
• –Policy governance: who should do what? 
• –Policy focus: is spatial targeting really the way forward? 
• –Policy instruments: how to facilitate policy innovation? 
 
6.2 Policy objectives: what does cohesion mean? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• 
•  What is cohesion? 
o economic and social cohesion? 
o reducing disparities between countries? 
o reducing disparities between regions in the EU? 
o reducing disparities between regions within countries? 
o territorial cohesion (balanced development)? 
o political cohesion? 
 
How do we reconcile the different dimensions of cohesion with:
o the Lisbon Agenda (competitiveness)? 
o the Gothenburg Agenda (sustainable development)? y Research Paper, No. 51    European Policies Research Centre 51
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Much of the discussion focused on the objectives of regional policy and the 
question of geographical scale. The traditional dichotomy for regional policy – 
efficiency versus equity objectives – has been reconfigured in the debate of 
competitiveness versus cohesion. Some argue that, if the priority for the 
European Union is to be the most competitive and dynamic economy in the 
world, then all other policies need to be subordinated to this objective. This is 
sometimes interpreted as prioritising growth over the reduction of inequality. 
Indeed, in an enlarging EU does it make sense to have an EU-wide objective for 
reducing disparities? Is this not a chimera, neither feasible nor desirable? Others 
maintain that policies for competitiveness and cohesion can be reinforcing. 
Ameliorating underdevelopment and addressing problems of structural change 
contribute both to the goals of improving growth and reducing disparities.  
It is important to be clear about geographical scale in this discussion of policy 
objectives. At an EU level, there is general agreement that the EU has an 
important role in reducing disparities between the poorer countries and the rest of 
the Union. In this respect, the EU can point to some successes. As the Second 
Cohesion Report pointed out, EU Structural and Cohesion Funds have 
contributed to a reduction in disparities between the poorest and richer Member 
States and between the poorest regions and the EU average.  
However, disparities between regions within the Member States have widened, a 
trend possibly exacerbated by EU policies. Recent development trends have 
been unequal at national and regional scales. As is well known, there are 
pockets of poverty within rich areas, and poor and rich areas are often located 
within the same labour markets. This is primarily a challenge for Member States - 
for national governments, regional and local authorities.  
One cautionary point concerns the need to relate regional disparities to the scale 
of the problem. Disparities will always exist; the key question is whether the 
economic or social conditions that they represent are of a scale or severity that 
justifies intervention. 
At national level, there are contradictory interpretations of the scale and scope of 
the regional policy response on the part of national governments, especially 
outside the Cohesion Countries. In some respects, it is possible to identify a 
renaissance of regional policy, with new emphasis on regionalising economic 
development responsibilities and promoting integrated and strategic approaches 
to economic development at regional level. However, many of these new regional 
policies provide support for all regions within a country, at the expense of 
traditional forms of regional policy support that favoured the ‘problem areas’.  It 
could be argued that these newer regional policies may well increase national 
and (in part) regional growth and competitiveness but at the expense of regional 
inequality within countries.  
The direction in which EU regional policy and EU competition policy are going is 
likely to face Member States with ‘hard choices’. Further decentralisation of 
responsibility for regional policy decisions, under both Structural Funds and State 
aid control, would mean national and, in some cases, regional governments 
having to make (perhaps unwelcome) choices about policy objectives, spatial 
coverage and modes of implementation. 
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A further point is that cohesion policy has not succeeded so far in eliminating 
unequal territorial development. The Treaty of European Union only refers to two 
aspects of cohesion:  
• economic cohesion, as the reduction of disparities measured by GDP at 
the regional level; and  
• social cohesion as reducing inequalities between individuals within 
regions with as most important targets employment and education. 
Why is there an omission of the concept of territorial cohesion (with the exception 
of Article16 which refers to access to public services)? The answer is that spatial 
planning belongs strictly to the competence of the Member States. However 
territorial cohesion is not to be confused with spatial planning. Economic and 
social cohesion do not necessarily evolve in a parallel manner over all territories 
for all individuals. There is a spatial concentration of economic development 
processes: the most prosperous regions in the EU are virtually all urban (with 
unemployment rates slightly above the EU average). There is a clear polarisation 
of population and economic activities around central areas. Cohesion policies 
and Structural Funds have not succeeded fully in eliminating unequal territorial 
development. Consequently, activities have to be spread more evenly over the 
EU-25 territory.   
Last but not least, there is a need for political cohesion. All Member States have 
to get involved in EU regional policy. There can be no question of re-nationalising 
Structural Funds policy. Finally, there was a feeling that cohesion policy is about 
regions lagging behind and consequently priority should remain on Objective 1 
regions. 
 
6.3 Policy governance: who should do what? 
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• How should future regional policies be organised? 
o delineation of responsibilities: separation of objectives from means of
implementation? 
o shared responsibilities: multi-level governance approach? 
What do subsidiarity and proportionality mean in practice? 
What is the added value of EU regional policy? 
o from an EU perspective? 
o from a national perspective? 
o from a regional perspective? y Research Paper, No. 51    European Policies Research Centre 53
 are clear differences among Member States in the organisation of future 
nal policy at European level. A strong case has been made by those 
cating a delineation and separation of responsibilities; many others 
cate a sharing of responsibilities between levels. If there is to be a multi-
governance approach, there was a general request for reducing the 
eptual complexity’ and increasing the transparency of EU regional policy.  
European Commission should define stable rules, give guidance and act 
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more as a coach than as a financial controller. Subsidiarity is based on trust and 
a certain degree of transparency and equity. The Commission should present a 
framework and leave the hard choices to the Member States. However, this does 
not imply re-nationalisation.   
One may question the current capacity of the European Commission – and 
especially its officials – to assume this new role, which requires specialised skills 
rather different from those related to financial or legal control. Either retraining of 
the staff or outsourcing should be considered. 
The governance of future EU regional policy should avoid the tendency towards 
a micro-management approach; the system needs to have the scope for policies 
to be tailored to local/regional situations. There should be a shift from a sectoral 
approach to territorial policy approach, which means that various sectoral policies 
(i.e. CAP, Environment, Transport etc) should be better integrated at the regional 
level. Sectoral policies have to be adapted to the regions and no longer the 
regions to the sectoral policies.  
Respecting the constitutional situation in each Member State, where possible the 
role of the regions, should be reinforced in regional programming but not only 
downstream (in implementation) but also upstream in contributing to the setting 
of the rules. Inside the EU institutional framework and besides the European 
Parliament, two committees could play a more important role: the Economic & 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. The problem with the CoR 
is, however, its heterogeneous composition. Thought should be given to 
increasing the use of partnership between public, private and voluntary sectors. 
Future added value can be maximised if the EU role concentrates on providing 
the overall vision and strategy, non-negotiable rules, the geographical 
concentration of support, thematic priorities and measures to ensure the 
effectiveness of intervention. A minimum level of resourcing to make a difference 
was also stressed; if resources are limited, concentration on a few, large projects 
might be necessary, although there are other ways of achieving added value 
from small amounts of funding.  
The question of resources is not the only issue. EU regional policy needs to 
operate in an environment that supports regional development, which 
encompasses other EC policies, national policies for economic and social 
cohesion and regional characteristics such as governance, political ability etc. 
It is important to note that not all aspects of the added value of EU support are 
measurable. Some parts of cohesion policy (eg. provision of funding to weaker 
countries and/or regions) are measurable. Other effects, such as multi-annual 
programming, are not measurable.  
Key elements of added value associated with the ‘methodology’ of EU 
intervention are perceived to be: 
• partnership – forcing people/institutions/interests to talk and work together 
in real co-operation; 
• strategic thinking – providing the impetus for strategic planning and 
management of support; 
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• multi-annual programming – a stable, predictable policy environment for 
local and regional organisations; 
• exchange of experience and the dissemination of good practice; 
• awareness of the European context – information and understanding of 
European institutions, policies and processes. 
In considering the added value of EU regional policy, it is important to be aware 
of the different stages of development and experience of countries/regions. 
There is an evolution in the ability of regions to generate added value over 
successive programming periods. Added value applies in principle to all regions 
(old and new Member States), but their ability to exploit it depends on factors like 
administrative capacity, choice of resource allocation system, programming 
experience and scope for flexibility. For example, new Member States were not 
allowed to decentralise the preparation and implementation of Structural Fund 
programmes to the regions despite the existence of relevant national legislation; 
others were forced to create artificial units (NUTS II) only for the purpose of 
managing the Funds. 
On the issues of accountability and efficiency, it was stressed that these were 
essential elements of the funding system. However, people on the ground are 
overwhelmed by cumbersome procedures and structures. The future system 
should be ‘worth the effort’ and ‘user-friendly’. As a general rule, existing national 
mechanisms should be used for ensuring accountability instead of introducing 
additional systems ie. no ‘double checks’.   
 
6.4 Policy focus: is spatial targeting really the way forward? 
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 How do we reconcile the spatial priorities of: 
o national regional policies, 
o EU regional policy, and 
o EU competition policies? 
What are the alternatives to map-based approaches to the design and
control of regional policy? search Paper, No. 51    European Policies Research Centre 55
general appreciation that strict State aid control is a major contributor to 
. Aid permitted in rich regions needs to be ‘compensated’ by even more  
s for intervention in the poorer countries/regions – resources which they 
ve. Therefore, the main value of State aids control is its help in ‘levelling 
g field’. 
, the relevance of controls of State aid for some segments of the 
, like tourism, can be questioned. Some take the view that the control of 
aid is overdone, on the grounds that most aid is sectoral aid, and that 
questionable’ trade/competition distortion of much regional aid spending.  
a major challenge to develop a  ‘test of significant competition distortion’ 
uld estimate/measure impacts of State aid in the case of particular 
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projects at regional, national and international levels. The test should be also 
able to differentiate between the impact of State aid on cohesion within the 
country versus its impact within other parts of Europe. This test would help to 
moderate the negative impacts of the ‘maps approach’ in State aid (especially 
the problem of location on ‘the wrong side of the road’). 
Looking to the future, there are real concerns about a ‘double negative effect’ ie. 
the withdrawal of State aid (through more restrictive award conditions) at the 
same time as losing eligibility for Structural Funds, especially in Objective 1 
regions. It was stressed that the main reason for losing eligibility are the EU 
budgetary constraints, but there is less logic to limiting State aid in ‘phasing out’ 
regions. This was considered as particularly dangerous/unfair in the case of 
regions losing eligibility due to the ‘statistical effect’. Mapping, which implies 
concentration, should not necessarily lead to an ex-ante fixed ceiling of the EU 
population. Subsidiarity and flexibility should be allowed. 
Equally, fears were also expressed about the incremental nature of impacts on 
competition induced by gradually supported growth of some attractive locations, 
for example within the ‘de minimis’ rule.   In future, strict criteria on State aids are 
needed as otherwise the governments of richer Member States would be 
tempted to support projects even in wealthy cities. 
On the key question of spatial coverage, it is difficult to move away from the fact 
that ‘regional policy is about maps’. Maps tend to be politically favoured, they 
provide focus and they represent a clear, easily understood framework. If maps 
are not used, it becomes very difficult to maintain coherence but there are some 
solutions. One of them may be to disconnect the eligibility phase (e.g. the 
calculation by the European Commission in accordance with the Member States 
of the amount allocated to each region or country on the basis of the population 
living in areas facing social, spatial or economic problems) from the programming 
phase (e.g. the choice by the region in accordance with the national authorities of 
the thematic priorities and the areas mostly in need). Thus, as the final map will 
not change the financial allocation, some flexibility may be accepted, for example 
+/- 10 percent of the agreed population coverage. This way of proceeding would 
permit a combination of efficiency, concentration, and policy requirements – the 
relevant maps for environment, social inclusion, economic regeneration 
measures may not be exactly the same.  It would also solve most of the marginal 
tensions raised when areas are designated.  
The problem, in an enlarged EU, is the arbitrariness of a 50 percent limit on 
spatial coverage and the danger of numerous, small, designated areas that lack 
the subtlety required for effective regional development.  A ‘horizontal approach’ 
might be an alternative, reflecting the fact that the regional policies of Member 
States are increasingly being applied to all regions and, in part at least, involve 
the co-ordination or management of resources under sectoral policies. However, 
there is a lack of clarity about how this could work in practice; it was argued that 
a horizontal approach to economic development is no longer a regional policy.   
In order to reinforce its legitimacy, it is important to preserve a territorial / regional 
dimension to cohesion policy and avoid it fading into other sectoral policies or 
priorities such as the Lisbon process. It was stated that cohesion policy is as 
much about helping the regions to fill the gap as about giving them opportunities. 
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However, the support for economic development must not be confused with the 
support for ‘excellence poles’.  
6.5 Policy instruments: how to facilitate policy innovation? 
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 How do we promote innovation in regional policy: 
o encouraging risk-taking and experimentation? 
o ensuring accountability and efficiency of spending? 
o controlling aid? 
What kinds of support are most appropriate? (subsidies, investment,
services etc)? 
Should we be considering new methods of delivery? search Paper, No. 51    European Policies Research Centre 57
ifferent aspects of innovation in regional policy were distinguished:  
novation in policy objectives  
novation in instruments,  
novation in procedures,  
novation in relation to other policies (like CAP, State aids etc). 
n in the past was mainly territorial innovation, which means accessibility 
. In the future, enterprises and universities should become the main 
f local innovation. At this stage, flexibility and adaptation to specific 
ances is necessary. The definition of innovation has to be left to the 
level and not imposed by national or European authorities. Innovation 
lso come from local partnerships by giving more responsibility to local 
he bottom-up approach of the Leader Community Initiative should be 
amed in the regional programmes. 
 was acknowledged that, at local and regional levels, competition policy 
much more as a constraint than an incentive to innovation. The ‘block 
tion’ system for SMEs is not an innovation-promoting instrument. 
